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Abstract
The operational disadvantages o f perfectly secure cipher systems has led to the development o f  
practically secure stream cipher systems. The security o f such cipher systems depend on the 
strength o f the keystream. In order to examine the strength of a sequence two different types of 
criteria are considered. Statistical tests, are designed to assess how a sequence with a particular 
property behaves randomly. Complexity measures, are applied to determine the complexity, or 
equivalently the unpredictability o f a sequence. Sequences obtained by LFSR are considered as 
building blocks of pseudo-random (PR) sequence generators. Transformations on the decimal 
expansion of irrational numbers is an alternative method for generating PR sequences, which are 
studied and some encouraging results are reported.
In order to generate o f  cryptographically strong pseudo-random sequences in parallel, w e have 
considered non-linear filtering o f the states of LFSRs. The non-linear filter used in this study, is 
exponentiation over finite fields. The result of exponentiation over GF(2q) can be regarded as 
q parallel component sequences. Cryptographic properties o f exponent sequences and their 
associated component sequences are studied. It is demonstrated that the component sequences 
o f exponents, that are prime to 29 - l ,  are statistically independent, have good statistical 
properties and have the maximum period ( 2q - 1  ). "
l
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Security o f information is as old as civilisation. A s early as the fifth century B.C. the 
Spartans established the first system of military cryptography. They employed a device 
called the "skytale". It consisted of a staff o f wood around which a strip o f leather or 
papyrus or parchment was closely wrapped. The secret m essage was written on the 
parchment down the length o f the staff; the parchment was then unwound and sent on its 
way. The disconnected letters made no sense unless the parchment was rewrapped around 
a baton o f the same thickness as the first; then words leapt from loop to loop, forming the 
original messagefKahn, 1967].
Today widespread use o f computer and communication systems requires extensive use o f  
cryptosystems for providing protection against various types o f attacks. Two types o f  
security exist in cryptography:
- perfect secrecy ; and
- practical secrecy.
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Perfect secrecy implies an unconditional security, where there is no method better than 
random guessing to break the system; it is assumed that the cryptanalyst has unlimited 
computing resources. An example o f such a cipher system is the one-time-pad which was 
first proposed in 1917 by Vemam [Kahn, 1967].
A  cipher system is practically secure if  a cryptanalyst with limited resources cannot break 
it.
The followings are the operational disadvantages o f perfectly secure cipher systems (such 
as the one-time-pad):
- key generation needs a random event to take place;
- key distribution needs a secure channel; and
- for the system to be perfectly secure the length of key should be equal to the length 
o f plaintext.
This has led to the development of stream ciphers which encipher the plaintext in the same 
way as the one-time-pad, but with a deterministically generated, random sequence. The 
security o f such a cipher system depends on the unpredictability o f  the key stream. 
Therefore, the main challenge in stream cipher design is to produce sequences that appear 
random.
Golom b [Golomb, 1967] formulated three postulates that a binary periodic sequence 
should satisfy in order to be regarded as a pseudo noise (PN) sequence. It has been shown 
that m-sequences which are produced by linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) can satisfy 
these properties. However, they are predictable and hence, weak from cryptographic point 
o f view . For a system to be secure, the keystream must be unpredictable, which means 
knowledge o f part o f the sequence should not enable a cryptanalyst to generate the whole 
sequence.
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In an m -sequence produced by a LFSR o f length L knowledge o f 2 L successive bits 
enables the cryptanalyst to determine the whole sequence. The most accepted parameter for 
estimating the unpredictability o f a sequence is the linear complexity, which is the length of 
the shortest linear feedback shift register that can produce that sequence. M -sequences 
have minimum linear com plexity with respect to their period. However, they may be 
combined to obtain highly complex pseudo-random (PR) sequences.
The aim o f this study is to generate cryptographically strong PR sequences using LFSRs.
In particular w e have considered the parallel generation o f PR sequences using, 
exponentiation for, non-linear filtering o f the states o f LFSRs.
In Chapter 2, a review o f cipher systems, the secrecy o f a cipher system, and perfect 
secrecy w ill be presented. Because o f operational disadvantages o f the perfectly secure 
cipher system s, the practically secure stream cipher system w ill be introduced. The 
strength o f stream cipher systems depends on the security o f the keystream. Common 
statistical properties o f truly random sequences are presented and it is shown that m- 
sequences have all o f these properties.
Randomness o f a sequence is usually determined by a set o f probabilities calculated for a 
number o f statistical tests. It w ill be shown, that statistical tests are necessary but not 
sufficient tests for security. This means that there exist sequences which satisfactorily pass 
the statistical tests but are still weak from the point o f view  o f cryptography. One o f the .  
m ost remarkable classes o f such sequences is the class of m-sequence where the main 
w eakness o f  the sequences is the predictability. Thus, w e need to exam ine the 
unpredictability (from the point o f view  of cryptography) o f a given sequence. The 
criterion used for this purpose is called complexity measure. Chapter 4 is devoted to the 
consideration o f  this criterion. The complexity measures which w ill be discussed are
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Turing-Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity, Ziv-Lempel complexity, and linear complexity. 
The linear com plexity is shown to have valuable properties as a measure o f  the 
unpredictability o f a sequence. Analysis o f the Berlekamp-M assey LFSR synthesis 
algorithm indicates that the most desirable sequences are those sequences in which their 
linear complexity growth closely follows the n i l  line. The significance o f com plexity  
measures is discussed.
Cryptographically strong PR sequences are considered in Chapter 5. It has been shown 
that non-linear filtering over the LFSRs can be applied in order to produce unpredictable, or 
equivalently more com plex, sequences. Multiplication o f component sequences are 
considered. It is shown that the product o f component sequences w ill have high linear 
com plexity but weak statistical properties. Irrational numbers as cryptographically strong 
PR sequence generators are considered. In order to produce binary sequences, a 
transformation is applied to the decimal expansion o f the irrational numbers. The main 
characteristic o f such sequences is that they are not periodic (in contrast to the sequences 
which are produced by using LFSRs). Our experimental results demonstrates that the 
binary sequences associated with the decimal expansion o f irrational numbers satisfactorily 
pass all statistical tests. Moreover, our study of their complexity suggests that irrational 
numbers have the potential o f producing very unpredictable sequences.
In Chapter 6 parallel generation o f cryptographically strong PR sequences is considered. 
Exponentiation is applied to the states o f LFSRs and an easy and econom ical way o f  
generating exponent sequences is presented. We study properties o f exponent sequences 
and their components and show that the higher linear complexity corresponds to the higher 
w eight o f the exponent. Experimental results confirm that exponent sequences have the 
potential o f producing sequences with good statistical distribution and high complexity.
4
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Chapter 7 contains the concluding remarks. The listing of the programs developed for this * 
study is included in appendix, for the sake of completeness.
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CHAPTER 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Review of the Basic Concepts
Since familiarity with terms o f a subject facilitates its understanding, brief definitions o f  
some common terms are presented.
- Plaintext is the message that will be put into secret form. Usually the plaintext is in 
the native language o f the communicators.
- Cryptography is the art/science o f designing secure systems.
- Cryptographic algorithm is a method o f protecting information by applying a 
transformation to the plaintext. Two basic types o f transformation exist, transposition and 
substitution.
- In transposition, the letters o f the plaintext are permuted. For example permuting 
characters o f secret gives etcrse.
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- In substitution, the letters o f the plaintext are replaced by other letters, numbers or 
symbols. For example secret might become xwioxv or 29 5 3318 502.
In transposition, frequency o f the letters remain unchanged, e.g., the two e ’s o f secret are 
still present in etcrse but in different positions. In substitution the letters retain their 
positions but lose their identities.
- Passing a plaintext through a transformation is enciphering and what com es out o f  
the transformation is the ciphertext, which is also called a cryptogram.
- The person possessing the key can decipher the ciphertext. Cryptanalysis, is the 
method used by persons who do not possess the key and attempting to find the plaintext. 
Sometimes cryptanalysis is called codebreaking.
- Cryptology embraces cryptography and cryptanalysis.
- Key is a secret piece o f information shared by communicants enabling them to do 
encryption/decryption securely.
- Keyspace  is the set o f all possible keys and the message space is the set o f all 
possible messages. If a word, phrase or stream serves as the key, it is naturally called the 
keyword, keyphrase or keystream.
2.2 Cipher Systems
A  cipher system  is a system  that provides secrecy by applying a key controlled  
transformation, called cryptographic algorithm , from a set o f m essages into a set o f  
ciphertexts. A  ciphertext is only decipherable by users who have access to the key. A  
cipher system consists o f three components:
.  The message that is to be enciphered.
- The key which is used by encryption and decryption algorithms.
- The ciphertext which is a meaningless representation of the message.
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The encryption algorithm is a special computation that operates on messages, to convert 
them into representations which are meaningless for all others than the intended receiver. 
Formally, an encryption algorithm is a single parameter family of invertible 
transformations,
{Ek ; k e K } ,
where Ek is the encryption algorithm and H s a key which belongs to the keyspace. If M
is the message space and C is the ciphertext space, then:
Ek : M -> C,
which means for any fixed encryption key k e K, Ek is an invertible transformation of the 
message M e  M into the cryptogram C g C, such that Ek{M) = C.
The encryption algorithm must have an inverse algorithm, E~k = Dk, called the decryption 
algorithm Dk : C -> M and for any C eC  there exists an M g M such that
Dk(Q  = Dk[Ek(M)] = = M .
Schematically a cipher system can be demonstrated as in Fig. 2.2.1.
Fig . 2.2.1 A cipher system
There are two different common classes of cipher systems, block ciphers and stream 
ciphers:
In block cipher systems the message must be divided into blocks, each block being 
encrypted with a fixed key. The enciphering operation in a block cipher is a substitution.
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Therefore, the block cipher transforms the same message blocks into the same ciphertext 
blocks. There are many cryptosystems which are based on the block cipher encryption. 
One o f the most remarkable o f block cipher systems is the data encryption standard (DES).
In stream cipher cryptosystems a stream o f key characters, a keystream, controls the 
transformation. The ciphertext is a string in which each element is produced by element­
w ise operations o f  the keystream on the message stream. Since the contents o f the 
keystream are varied from time to time, two occurrences o f the same messagetext usually 
produce two different ciphertexts. One o f the most remarkable o f stream cipher systems is 
the one-time-pad.
2.3 Secrecy
The most important property o f a cryptosystem is its secrecy. The cryptographer may 
utilise software/hardware facilities in order to provide security against cryptanalysis efforts. 
Cryptanalysts make use o f information on the nature o f its enciphering algorithms, the 
context o f the m essages and the statistical properties o f  the plaintext la n g u a g e . 
Cryptanalysis presents a system identification problem, and the goal o f cryptography is to 
build systems that are difficult to identify [Seberry and Pieprzyk, 1989].
Two types of security exist in cryptography: perfect security and practical security.
In perfect security there is no method better than guessing to break the system, even if  the 
cryptanalyst has unlimited time and computing resources. An example o f such cipher 
systems is the one-time-pad which was first proposed in 1917 by Vemam [Kahn, 1967].
9
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In practical security a cryptanalyst with limited time or resources cannot break the system.
2.3.1 Perfect Secrecy
Shannon [Shannon, 1949] defined perfect secrecy systems as those systems in which the 
cryptanalyst gains no more information about the message, after receiving the ciphertext. 
Let PC(M)  be the probability that a message M  was sent, given that C was received,
perfect secrecy means that:
Pc(M)  =  P(M),
for all M  and C , where P(M)  is the a priori probability of M . Using Bayes’ theorem:
w  =
P(M)Pm(C)
P(C)
the conditions for perfect secrecy can be re stated as:
PM(C) = P(C ),
for all M  and C. In a perfectly secure cryptosystem the number o f keys is at least as great 
as the number o f M s. The only system with perfect security is the one-time-pad. The key 
used w ill be discarded after each transmission, because it is possible that two ciphertexts 
which are encrypted with the same key could be correlated.
2.3.2 The One-Time-Pad Cipher System
The only perfect security cryptosystem is the one-time-pad. The Vemam cipher, which is 
developed by G. Vemam in 1917 for telegraph communications, is a special type o f one­
time-pad cipher system [Kahn, 1967]. The one-time-pad cryptosystem consists o f three 
components as follows:
10
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- The message that is to be enciphered (messagetext).
- A  random sequence (keystream).
- The production o f enciphering algorithm (ciphertext).
The random sequence contains elem ents from the same alphabet as found in the 
m essagetext. A  separate random key is generated for each message. The ciphertext is 
produced by the operation o f the encryption algorithm over the elements o f the messagetext 
and the keystream. So, an element, Cf, o f the ciphertext corresponds to the encryption o f  
the elements Mi and o f the messagetext and the keystream respectively.
Example 2.3.2.1
Assum e bit sequences 100110100110 and 010111001010 are the m essagetext and the 
keystream respectively, and let the encryption algorithm be defined as XOR-ing these two 
sequences bit by bit. Thus, Cf = 0 if  M- and kt are the same, otherwise C{ — 1 (for
1 < i < n  where n is the length o f the message). So, we will have:
messagetext = 100110100110 ©
keystream = 010111001010
ciphertext = 110001101100
If the cryptanalyst has no information about the key, s/he could not discover which one o f  
2” possible m essages is the original (it is assumed that all m essages are acceptable, 
however, if  the cryptanalyst has more information about the plaintext in order to ignore 
som e illegal m essages, s/he is still faced with a problem of choosing one o f the N  < 2" 
remaining messages by guess-work).
In the one-time-pad cipher system each message is enciphered with a new key which is 
produced randomly (i.e. by tossing a coin, rolling a die, etc.). Thus the keystream is  
completely independent o f the messagetext. This implies perfect secrecy for the one-time-
CHAPTER 2
pad cipher system. In spite o f offering perfect secrecy, the one-time-pad cryptosystem  
suffers from the following weaknesses:
- In order to maintain perfect secrecy a separate random sequence for each message 
must be generated, thus an unlimited number o f keys is needed.
" Since the keystream cannot be reproduced, both the sender and receiver o f the 
cryptosystem need to know the random sequence. A  secure channel is required in order to 
transmit the entire random sequence.
" To generate a random sequence, a random event (i.e. toss o f a coin, roll o f  a die, 
etc.) must take place. It is not practical when long messages, or a large number o f short 
m essages, need to be sent.
Therefore, the applicability o f the one-time-pad has been mainly limited to particular 
situations, where perfect secrecy is o f paramount importance (i.e. the London-Washington­
London hotline). The operational disadvantages o f the one-time-pad have led to the 
developm ent o f practical secure stream ciphers which are able to retain positive  
characteristics o f one-time-pads while avoiding most o f their negative aspects. The 
plaintext is enciphered in much the same way as the one-tim e-pad, but with  
deterministically generated random sequences.
2.4 Stream Ciphers
A  stream cipher cryptosystem enciphers the data using a deterministically generated PR 
sequences. W e note that one-time-pad is a special case o f a stream cipher system. The 
sequence which controls the enciphering, is called the keystream. The deterministic 
algorithm which produces the keystream by using a short key is called the key generator. 
The main challenge in stream cipher design is to produce keystreams which appear random.
12
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Since the keystreams are not truly random, they are called pseudo-random (PR) sequences. - 
The strength o f stream cipher systems, as practically secure cryptosystems, depends on the 
security o f the keystream.
One o f the main weaknesses o f the stream cipher cryptosystems is the non-randomness o f  
the keystream . If the keystream is not produced with care, w eaknesses o f  the 
cryptosystem may lead to information leaking from messagetext. However, the advantages 
o f stream ciphers over the one-time-pad are:
- A  single algorithm can be used to produce different PR sequences (by using 
different keys).
- Instead o f random events, a computer can be used to generate the keystreams.
- Since the algorithm is known to both parties of the system, a short key can be sent 
via a secure channel to the receiver.
2.5 PN Sequences
The sequences under consideration here are binary. The most familiar exam ple o f  a 
random sequence arises from tossing a perfect coin consecutively, assigning 0  and 1 to two 
possible cases respectively.
Let S =  j j ,j2,...,be a periodic binary sequence.
- The period o f the sequence S is the smallest o f P if  si+p = sf for all i > 0.
- A  run o f length k starts at position t if  st_{ * s t = st+1 = ...=  st+k̂  *  st+k.
Two different types o f runs exist [Tilborg, 1988],
a block o f length k ; O il . ..110, 
a gap o f length k; 100 ...001 .
13
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- The autocorrelation, AC(k) , is defined by:
( P - 2 X  (¿i®  *,-♦*))
AC(k) = ---------=1---------------  , for k = 1,2,....
P
A  PN sequence must satisfy Golom b’s randomness postulates. G olom b’s randomness 
postulates for periodic binary sequences are as follows:
- If p  is even, then the number o f ones is equal to the number o f zeros. Otherwise 
the number o f ones is one more than the number o f zeros per period.
- The number o f runs o f length k in a period is 1 /2 * . Moreover, half o f the runs o f  
a certain length are blocks, the other half are gaps.
- The autocorrelation function AC(k) is two-valued for a period. Explicitly
fAC(£) = l, if k = np,
[AC(fc) = -1  /  p  otherwise.
Sequences which can satisfy Golom b’s randomness postulates are called pseudo noise 
(PN) sequences [Golomb, 1967]. One o f the most popular tools to produce pseudo noise 
sequences is the shift register.
2.6 Linear Feedback Shift Registers, M-Sequences
Shift register sequences are widely used in secure systems. The theory o f shift register 
sequences is w ell studied. A  shift register is an arrangement o f n cell registers in a row, 
each register containing either one or zero (Fig. 2.6.1). A  particular content o f cells  
determines a state o f the shift registers. If the contents o f each cell is shifted into the next 
($. <— si+1, 0 < i < h )  a new state w ill be formed. If no new signals are input into the
14
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registers after the maximum number of n shifts, the contents of all cells will be zero and 
will remain in that state.
sn- sn-
Fig. 2 .6 .1  A shift register.
In order to keep the shift register active, a new signal can be introduced into the cell, sn_19 
using a feedback function. If the new signal is produced using a linear function, the shift 
register is called a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). Otherwise it is a Non-Linear 
Feedback Shift Register (NLFSR). The general schematic of a LFSR is presented in Fig. 
2.6.2. The coefficients ci are called the feedback coefficients. If c, = 0 then corresponding
switch is open, if ci =l  this switch is closed. After the first shift (time unit) the shift 
register will output s0 and go to the state such that:
Sn = C0S0 + C lS l + ...+ C n_lSn_u  (1)
where cf e GF(2), and the addition is modulo 2. The equation (1) or in general:
Sn+k ~  C0S k +  Cl S k + l+ " ’ + C n - l S k + n - l f
which is called linear recurrence, means that any element of the sequence can be produced 
by its preceding n elements. The linear recurrence of the sequence is associated with a 
polynomial called characteristic polynomial:
xn -  c0x° + q x 1 + c2x2+...+cn_lxn \  
or,
n
/(x )  = c0 + CxX  + C2X 2+ ...+ C n_lX n~l + CnX n -  ^ C fx' .
¿=0
The coefficients of polynomials under consideration in this chapter are either zero or one. 
It is known that, polynomials with binary coefficients form a ring over GF(2) [Lidl and 
Niederreiter, 1986]. The ring formed by the polynomials over GF(2) is called the 
polynomial ring over GF(2) and is denoted by F2[x]. A polynomial p e F2[x] is said to
15
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be irreducible over GF(2) (or irreducible in F2 [x]) if p  has positive degree and p = gh 
with gyhe F2[x] implies that either g=p or h=p.
F ig . 2.6.2 A linear feedback shift register (LFSR).
Since each state of the LFSR is determined by its previous state, and the number of 
possible states with n registers is 2n y ultimately a repetition will occur, resulting in 
periodicity. If the state of all zeros ever occurs, the subsequent states will also consists of 
all zeros, and the period p  = 1 < 2” # Otherwise, the state of all zeros will never occur and 
the period p  < 2”. Thus in LFSRs the period of the sequences produced by n cell registers 
is less than 2”. If the sequence has a maximal period p = 2” -1 ,  it is called an m- 
sequence.
Example 2.6.1
With n = 4, c0 = c1 = c2 = c3 = 1 and the initial state (1,0,0,0) the following states will
occur.
1
2
3
4
5
1
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 i
0 0 i i
0 1 i 0
1 1 0  0
The number of distinct states, or equivalently the period of the output sequence is 5. The 
output sequence is (10001)00. The linear recurrence of this sequence is s4 = s0 + s{+ s2 + s3 
or in general:
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«̂+4 "I" £„+1 "I" $ n+2 «̂+3 » ^ “ 0, 1, 2, . . . ’
and its characteristic polynomial (we consider the characteristic polynomial for n = 0) is :
f ( x )  = 1 + X  + X 2 +J£3+ X 4.
It has been shown that if the characteristic polynomial is irreducible, then the period of the 
sequence divides 2” - 1  [Golomb, 1967]. In Example 2.6.1 the characteristic polynomial 
f ( x)  = 1 + x + x2 + x3 + x4 is irreducible and the period of the produced sequence is 5 
which divides 24 - 1  = 15. The irreducible characteristic polynomials which can produce 
m-sequences are called primitive polynomials
Example 2.6.2
With n = 4, Cq — 1, cl = c2 = 0, c3 = 1 and the initial state (1,0,0,0) the following states will 
occur
1
<- 1 0 0 0 f -
1 1 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 1
3 0 0 1 1
4 0 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1 0
7 1 1 0 1
8 1 0 1 0
9 0 1 0 1
10 1 0 1 1
11 0 1 1 0
12 1 1 0 0
13 1 0 0 1
14 0 0 1 0
15 0 1 0 0
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The period o f the sequence is 15 = 24 - 1 ,  the linear recurrence is sn+4 = s n+ sn+3, and the 
characteristic polynomial is f {x)  = \ + x3 + xA which is an irreducible (furthermore a 
prim itive) polynom ial. The sequence o f  states o f  the first ce ll register is  
100011110101100. The sequence corresponding to the second cell is the same as the first 
one, except for a delay o f one state. Similar to the other cell registers. Moreover, each cell 
register satisfies the same linear recurrence which is:
Sn+4 =  Sn *^«+3*
It has been shown that for an irreducible characteristic polynomial,
f (x)  = '£ c ixl,
¿=0
there exists a polynomial g(x) = l  +  * m, m > n  such that f (x)  divides g(x) [Lidl and 
Niederreiter, 1986]. The smallest m is equal to the period o f the sequence associated with 
the characteristic polynomial, / ( * ) .  If m = T  then f (x)  is called a prim itive  
polynom ial. In Example 2.6.1 we have 1 + x5 = ( l  + x + x2 + x 3 + x 4)(l + x \  thus the 
sm allest m is 5 which is equal to the period o f the sequence associated with the 
characteristic polynomial f (x)  = 1 + x + x 2 + x3 + x \  Meanwhile the smallest m such that 
the characteristic polynomial f (x)  = 1 + x +  x4 can divide the polynomial g (x ) = 1 +  xm is 
15, which is equal to the period o f the sequence associated with the characteristic 
polynomial f (x )  = 1 +  x +  x4.
It is easy to demonstrate that m-sequences meet Golomb’s randomness postulates in a 
satisfactory way. It seems that m-sequences are suitable to be used as keystreams in stream 
ciphers. But, the main weakness of m-sequences is that they are very predictable. In fact, 
know ledge o f  2n consecutive bits o f an m-sequence, which is produced by n cell 
registers, enables the cryptanalyst to determine the linear recurrence and thus the whole
18
CHAPTER 2
sequence. Suppose, the cryptanalyst knows then s/he can compute the
coefficients o f the linear recurrence using the following equations:
Sk+n ~ C0Sk  + • • • +  Cn - l Sk+n-l*
Sk+n+l ~  C0Sk+l +  ^ 1 ^ + 2  + • • • +  Cn - \S k+n
( 1 )
^A:+2n-l C0Sk+ n-l ClSk+n + • • • +  Cn - \Sk+2n-2 ’
To overcom e this problem, the sequences must reach a high linear recurrence so that 
solving the equations (1) would be infeasible. However, increasing the number o f cell 
registers into an arbitrary number is inefficient and impractical. Fortunately, non-linear 
filtering over LFSRs results in sequences with a linear complexity close to the period o f  
sequence.
2.7 Summary
A  number o f topics have been considered in this chapter: what is a cipher system; what is 
perfect secrecy and the characteristics of a cipher system which offer perfect secrecy; what 
are stream cipher systems and what are PN sequences? Since the strength o f a stream 
cipher system  is dependent on the secrecy o f the keystream, the main challenge in 
designing a stream cipher system is generation of cryptographically strong PR sequences to 
be used as keystreams. Shift registers, which are the most efficient and popular tools in 
producing binary sequences, have been considered for this purpose. The main 
characteristic o f the shift registers (with respect to the other key generators) is its rich and 
powerful mathematical basis. Since the sequences which are selected as keystreams must
19
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be resistant to the cryptanalyst attacks the next chapter will present statistical assessments in 
order to examine the randomness o f a given sequence.
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CHAPTER 3
Standard Statistical Tests
In this chapter statistical tests w ill be considered. They are designed to determine i f  a 
sequence appears random. A  value, for a particular property, w ill be calculated for a given 
sequence. The calculated value is called the statistical value. The statistical value w ill be 
compared with distribution o f the corresponding values for random sequences. If the 
sequence exhibits a property that very few  truly random sequences do, then it w ill be 
concluded that with high probability the sequence does not represent a random sequence 
very w ell. Otherwise it is concluded that the sequence behaves randomly or equivalently 
the sequence passes the test. The aim of applying the statistical tests is to estimate how a 
sequence behaves randomly.
The theory o f statistics provides quantitative measures for randomness. A  set o f statistical 
tests is applied to the sequence and if  the sequence passes all the tests satisfactorily, then it 
is considered random sequence. In this study we have considered five statistical tests.
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3.1 Chi-Square Test (%2 Test)
The chi-square test is perhaps the best known statistical tests. A  general description o f the 
chi-square test is as follows: suppose that every observation o f an event falls into one of the 
k distinct categories cl9c2,...9ck with probabilities r e sp e c tiv e ly . n
independent observations w ill be made. Let xt be the number o f observations which fall 
into category /, 1 < i < k. The chi-square value is given by:
Y  — (•*! ~  n P l )  | (x2 ~  K P l )  | | (%k ~  f tP k  )
nPi np2 npk ’
or
v  = y ^ L ~ ”P.)2 , ( i )
l A  n P i
where np{ is the expected number of observations in category i. In order to compare the 
computed value, V , with distribution o f the corresponding values for random sequences, a 
table such as Table 3.1 is used. It gives selected values o f the chi-square distribution with 
D being degree of freedom. The degree o f freedom is defined as one less than the number 
of categories. In fact the k categories are not completely independent. Since we have:
xl +  x2+...+xk =  n , and
p x+ p 2+.. .+pk = \ ,
Xj can be computed given (k - 1) values of x} for 1 < j  < k and j  *  i.
If the table entry in row, u;, column, p; is Cij9 this means that for random sequences the 
quantity V in equation (1) will be greater than C-- with probability Pj. For instance, when
the degree o f  freedom is 3, the computed value obtained by the chi-square test with 
probability 99% is greater than 0.1148 (in other words, with probability 1% it is less than 
or equal to 0.1148), with probability 95% is greater than 0.3518 (again with probability 
5% it is less than or equal to 0.3518), and so on. Note howevere, the table entries are valid
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for large enough values of n . Categories whose expected values are less than five can be 
grouped to obtain larger categories with increased expected values.
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TABLE 3.1
SELECTED VALUES OF THE CHI-SQUARE DISTRIBUTION 
(For further values, see Handbook o f Mathematical Functions, ed. by M. Abramowitz and I.A. Stegun, 
U .S. Government Orinting O ffice, 1964, Table 26.8.)
p = 99% p = 959? p = 75% p = 50% p = 25% p = 5% p = 1%
\) = 1 0.00016 0.00393 0.1015 0.4549 1.323 3.841 6.635
u  = 2 0.02010 0.1026 0.5753 1.386 2.773 5.991 9.210
0) = 3 0.1148 0.3518 1.213 2.366 4.108 7.815 11.34
np 0.2971 0.7107 1.923 3.357 5.385 9.488 13.28
loIIp 0 .5543 1.1455 2.675 4.351 6.626 11.07 15.09
\) = 6 0.8720 1.635 3.455 5.348 7.841 12.59 16.81
v  = 1 1.239 2.167 4.255 6.346 9.037 14.07 18.48
1.646 2.733 5.071 7.344 10.22 15.51 20.09
\) = 9 2.088 3.325 5.899 8.343 11.39 16.92 21.67
d  = 10 2.558 3.940 6.737 9.342 12.55 18.31 23.21
'0 = 11 3.053 4.575 7.584 10.34 13.70 19.68 24.73
x> = 12 3.571 5.226 8.438 11.34 14.84 21.03 26.22
0) = 15 5.229 7.261 11.04 14.34 18.25 25.00 30.58
d  = 20 8.260 10.85 15.45 19.34 23.83 31.41 37.57
ocnIIP 14.95 18.49 24.48 29.34 34.80 43.77 50.89
\) = 50 29.71 34.76 42.94 49.33 56.33 67.50 76.15
Xp = -2.33 -1.64 -.675 0.00 0.675 1.64 2.33
V > 30 approximately v  +  2 4 v x p + —xp 2
3
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3.2 Frequency Test
The frequency test is applied to determine whether a sequence behaves randomly with 
respect to the number o f zeros and ones. This is perhaps a very obvious requirement that a 
pseudo-random  sequence must satisfy. If a keystream contains more zeros than ones, or 
vice versa, then the cryptanalyst by using a sequence o f all zeros, or all ones respectively, 
would be able to gain some information about the plaintext. A  binary symmetric source 
(BSS) is a source with two equally likely outputs 0 and 1 such that each output is emitted 
independently from all the previous outputs. In sequences produced by a BSS, the 
probability o f 0  or 1 occurring will be 1 /  2 . Thus there are two categories (0 and 1), each 
with the same probability p x = p2 = 1 /  2. Let x0 and xx be the number o f observations in
each category. To apply the chi-square test for a sequence o f length n it is necessary to 
compute the statistical value, V , which is given by:
y - 1
¿=0 —
The degree o f freedom is 1 ( 2 - 1  = 1). According to the values o f Table 3.1, with 
probability 95%, the value o f V will not exceed 3.841. Therefore, the sequence is said to 
pass satisfactorily the frequency test if  the computed statistical value is less than or equal to 
3.841 (corresponding to p  =  5%). However, it is still possible that the sequence w ill not 
behave randomly with respect to the other properties. For instance consider a periodic 
sequence 1010... 1010 which consists o f the same number o f zeros and ones. Then 
x0 =  xl = n /  2 and consequently the statistical value, V = 0 < 3.841, but this periodic
sequence does not behave randomly with respect to tests discussed later. In order to make 
the expected number o f observations equal to five in each category, the length o f the 
sequence must be at least 2 x 5  = 1 0 .
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3.3 Serial Test
Generally the number o f occurrences o f each pair o f bits in a random sequence should be 
the same. Thus for sequences which behave randomly similar property is expected. The 
possible states o f two bits are 0 0 ,0 1 ,1 0 ,1 1 . Suppose 00 occurs n^ times, 01 occurs n0l 
times, 10 occurs times and 11 occurs nu . Idealy w e want nm = n01 =nlQ= nu ~
In [Beker and Piper, 1982] it has been mentioned that
n  1 i=0 j=0 n  i=o
where n0 and nx are the number o f zeros and ones in the sequence, is approximately 
distributed as %2 with two degrees o f freedom. Thus the statistical value o f the test will be 
given by:
V =
n  1 i= 0 y=0 n  i=0
)2 + l .
In order to compare the computed statistical value of V with the selected values o f the chi- 
square distribution o f Table 3.1, it is seen that with probability 95% (corresponding to 
p=5%) V should be less than or equal to 5.991. Thus if  V is not greater than 5.991 the 
sequence is considered to behave randomly with respect to the serial property.
It is easy to demonstrate that a sequence, which will not behave randomly with respect to 
som e properties, can pass the serial test satisfactorily. For instance, consider the periodic 
sequence s = l 1001100... 11001100. The number o f observations o f each pair 00, 01, 10, 
and 11 for the sequence is (n - 1)/4 and n0 =  nx = n/2 thus the statistical value is V =  0 ,
but this sequence w ill not behave randomly with respect to run test.
In order to make the expected number o f observations equal to five in each category, the 
length o f the sequence must be at least 5 x  4 = 20.
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3.4 Poker Test
In poker test the sequence is partitined into blocks (or hands) o f size m. Then the test can 
be applied for different values o f m. Howevere, in certain circumstances som e values o f  
m may be more relevant. For example if  every 5 bits o f the sequence corresponds to an 
alphabetic letter then m = 5 is a more relevant choice. In this study w e assumed m = 5, 
thus each observation is considered to be a group o f five successive elem ents o f the 
sequence. Let S = sl9s29...9sn9 be a given sequence, then each observation is a five  
successive elem ents o f the sequence (i.e. s5j+l9s5j+29...9s5j+5 , 0 < 7 <L fJ)- These
observations can be classified into seven categories as follows:
category instance
All different ABODE
One pair AABCD
Two pairs AABBC
Three o f a kind AAABC
Full house AAABB
Four o f a kind AAAAB
Five of a kind AAAAA
For binary sequences the patterns associated with the category 'A ll different', are 10101 
and 01010, while the patterns associated with the category 'One pair', are 00101, 01001, 
01011, 01101, 10010, 10100, 10110, and 11010. By this classification the expected  
number o f observations for distinct categories are different Knuth [Knuth, 1969] suggests 
a second classification based on the number of distinct runs in each group. There would be 
five categories:
1 different: Five of a kind
2 different: Full house or Four o f a kind
3 different: Two pairs or Three o f a kind
4 different: One pair
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5 different: All different
The number o f possible patterns associated with five bits is 2s = 32 . The possible patterns 
in each category are as follows:
category possible patterns
1 different 00000, 11111
2 different 00001, 00011, 00111, 01111, 10000, 11000, 11100, 11110
3 different 00010, 00100, 00110, 01000, 01100, OHIO, 10001, 10011,
10111, 11001, 11011, 11101
4 different 00101, 01001, 01011, 01101, 10010, 10100, 10110, 11010
5 different 01010, 10101
Thus the number o f evidences and their associated probabilities for each category are as 
follows:
category number of maximum possibilities probability
1 different 2
2
32 (a )
2 different 8
8
32
( P i )
3 different 12
12
32 (a )
4 different 8
8
32 ( P i )
5 different 2
2
32 (Ps)
the probability o f an observation, p ., for category /, is computed by dividing the
number o f observations in category /, q.9 by the number o f observations. To apply the 
chi-square test, the statistical value is given by:
y - Y ^ - q p , ) 2
t i  w
where qp{ denotes the expected number o f observations which fall into the category i and 
is  computed for each category simply by multiplying q = \ n / 5 j by their associated  
probability. Since the number o f categories is five then the degree o f freedom is four and,
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according to the selected values o f the chi-square distribution o f Table 1 (with probability 
95%), the acceptable value for V is less than or equal to 9.488. The expected number o f  
observations in category one and five (which have the lowest probabilities) is given by 
|_ n /5 j  x  2 /  32 . Therefore, the minimum required length o f the sequence, that gives at 
least five observations in each category, can be computed by: (\_n /  5J x  2 /  32) > 5 , which  
gives n > 400.
3.5 Run Test
In a truly random sequence the probability of occurrence of ones and zeros is equal to 1 /  2 , 
w hile the probability o f observing 00 or 11 is 1 /  22. Similarly, larger length o f  runs are 
associated with lower probabilities. A  pseudo-random sequence is expected to behave 
similar to random sequences with respect to runs. According to the Golomb's randomness 
postulates, the number o f runs o f length i is half o f the number o f runs o f length i + 1. 
Since half o f the runs in a sequence has length one, then the number o f runs o f length i is 
1 /2 '  tim es the total number o f runs in the sequence. Moreover, half o f the runs o f a 
certain length are blocks, the other half are gaps.
In order to apply the chi-square test the number o f runs in the sequence must be known. 
Let X 0i and XI- be the number of gaps and blocks with length i respectively (they may be 
different for the sequence), and let Y0{ and Y\i be the expected number o f gaps and 
blocks with length i respectively (it is expected they are the same). According to the
Golomb's randomness postulates the length of the longest run in a sequence of length n is 
equal to |~Log2(n)]  (the minimum length of an LFSR that can produce a PN sequence o f
length n ). Let m be the number o f runs in a sequence o f length n. Since 1 /  21 o f runs
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have length one, 1 /  2 2 o f runs have length two, and in general 1 / 2 ' o f runs have length 
i ,  thus:
n = { ^ m x \  + i m x 2  +...+ mx[Log2(n ) ] ) ,
m
2' 2‘ 2' 
l . +  _2_ +  +
2‘  2‘  ■ "  
n
n = m < ^ + *+■■■+
rm 2C>l ;
X -
i f  2 -
Hence the expected number o f gaps (or blocks) o f length i is:
m  =  y i . .= 4 *f+1
In order to apply the chi-square test we compute the following statistical values
where V0 and Vx are statistical values with respect to the occurrences o f  gaps and blocks 
respectively. Let k0 and ^  be the number o f categories for gaps and blocks respectively.
Since the probability o f occurrence o f gaps and blocks o f a particular length is the same, 
thus k0 -  . In order to make the expected number o f observations equal to five in each
category, observe that one o f the runs has the length |"Log2{n ) \  two o f the runs have the 
length \Log2 (n)~\ - 1 , four o f the runs have the length [ Log2(n)~] -  2 , and eight o f the runs 
have the length |”Log2 (« )] -  3. Thus 1 +  2 +  4 + 8 = 15 of runs have the length greater than 
or equal to |" Log2 (n)~\ -  3. Since half o f those are gaps and the other half are blocks, then
k0 = k i = lL °g 2(n )] -3 ,
and thus, all gaps o f length k0 or greater than k0 will fall into the category k0 and all blocks 
o f length or greater than kx will fall into the category kY. The degree o f freedom for V0 
is equal to k0 - 1  and the degree o f freedom for V1 is equal to ^  - 1  The number o f the 
degree o f freedom for the statistical value, V = V0 +  Vv  which must be compared with the
selected values o f the chi-square distribution o f Table 3.1, is equal to [Freeman, 1963]
(*0 - ! )  +  ( * , - ! )  = 2 ([ Log2(n)\ -  4).
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In order to apply the chi-square test (with minimum five categories for gaps and blocks
respectively), the minimum required length o f the sequence can be computed by requiring 
f Log2(r ij\- 3  > 5 which gives n > 128.
A s an example, the PN sequences o f length 2047, which can be produced by an LFSR of  
length 11, w ill consist o f eight categories, k0 = kx = |~Log2(2 0 4 7 ) ] -  3 = 1 1 - 3  = 8 , (for
each type o f runs) and thus the number o f runs is given by
nm = — 2047
2 3 4 5
4 8 16 32 64 128 256
l 1 , ± J Dy  —r --- 1-----1-----1-----H------
4-t 2l 2 A * 
6 7 8
+ —  + -----+
2047
1.96
1044.
W e note that, the degree o f freedom in this case is equal to 2(11 -  4) = 14.
3.6 Autocorrelation T est
The purpose o f this test is to determine whether there is a correlation between the bits o f a 
sequence and the bits o f a shifted version o f the same sequence. Therefore, a chi-square 
test, which is designed for independent observations, can not be applied in this case. Let 
S = s1,s2,...,sn be a sequence. The statistical value for the autocorrelation test is given by:
V(*) = £ * ,© * * *  k = l ,2 , . . . ,n - l ,
i=1
where the statistical value, V(k), determines the number o f disagreements among the n 
pairs Si and si+lc, 1 < i< n .  Since V(k) for a random binary sequence is the sum of n
independent random variables, V(k) follows a binomial distribution with mean
1 n Li = n x — = — .
*  2 2
A  "good" value o f V(k) is given by [Knuth, 1969]
( /Z -2 c 7 )< P (* )< ( /t+ 2 (T ) , (1)
where c  is the standard deviation o f V(k) and is given by [Freeman, 1963]:
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V 2 2 4 V2
Thus if  V(k) satisfies the equation ( 1) in 95% o f cases the sequence is considered to
behave randomly with respect to autocorrelation property, otherwise it is rejected as a 
random sequence.
3.7 Cross Correlation Test
The statistical tests are designed to determine how randomly a single sequence behaves 
with respect to a particular property. In this study, statistical dependence o f collections o f  
sequences must be assessed. In this section we propose a statistical test to measure this 
dependence. Let 1 < i< q ]  be a collection of q sequences each with length n, and
let each sequence pass the statistical tests satisfactorily. Then at least one more test must be 
applied to this set o f sequences to ensure that the knowledge o f a subset o f /? < #  
sequences would not deliver extra information about sequences not in the subset.
A  set o f q o f sequences, {$(/), 1 < i < q ] , is statistically independent if  for any subset of 
p  < q sequences, {s(/; ), j  =  1, 2 ,. . . ,p  - 1} , we have:
Nfr (ip I i\, ¿2 » • • • » Ip-1 • ,..., tXp_ j )
nh(ip)
2p-i ¿ = 0 , 1,
where Nh(ipli19t2,...,ip_1:(z1,a 2 9...,(xp_1) is  the number o f cases that s(ip) = h and 
s(ii)  = oc1, s(i2) = a 2y ...» s(i = a  19 and nh(ip) is the number o f cases in which  
s(ip) =  h [Safavi-Naini, 1990].
Corollary: If set P is statistically independent then any subset o f P is also statistically 
independent.
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Example 3 .7 .1
Consider the following set o f sequences (q = 4 ) :
s ( l ) 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
s(2 ) 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
s(3) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
s(4) 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
- Let ¿3 = 1, =  2, i2 = 3 , c ^ = l ,  a 2 = 0  then
1V0(1I 2 ,3 :  1,0) = 2, Bo(1) = 7 - 4  1V0(11 2,3 : l,0 ) = ^->
^ (1 1  2 ,3 :  1,0 ) = 2, 71,(1) = 8 ->  IV,( 1 1 2,3 : 1,0) = 4 "
- Let i4 = 2, = 1, ¿2 = 4, /3 = 3, aj = 1, a 2 = 1, a 3 = 1, then
W,(2 I 1,4,3 : 1,1,1) = 1, n,(2) = 8 ->  IV,(2 I 1,4,3 : 1,1,1) = 4 ,
2
Q
A70(2 I 1 ,4 ,3 : U , l )  =  l, n0(2) = l - >  N0(2 I 1,4,3 : 1,1,1) = ^ -
The autocorrelation test is a special case o f the cross correlation test when p  =  2 and s(/2) 
is a shifted version o f the original sequence, s(i{). For a set, p , o f random sequences, in
w hich  they are statistica lly  independent, the mean o f  the statistical value, 
Nh (*p Ih, h * • • • * ip-\: a i * a 2 »• • • * °> - i) >can be computed by dividing nh (ip) by 2p~l , thus:
*(fp)
2J,_1
1n x  — 
___ 2 _ n
2p-i 2P ’
The standard deviation w ill be given by [Freeman, 1963]:
1 1
<7 = « n x  —  x  1 ------V 2 P y 2 p ) = i W l - 2P
Again, i f  the statistical value, Nh(i 1 , /2,. . . , f l:av a 2,... ,a  2), more than 95% o f the
1
cases is between ( p - 2 < j )  and (/i +  2 <j), the set o f p  sequences are considered to be 
statistically independent
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Theorem 3 .7 .1
P  i
In an LFSR of length p  with a primitive characteristic polynomial, f ( x)  = ^ c .x  , the set
i=0 1
o f  p  m -sequences (components) associated with distinct cell registers are statistically 
independent.
Proof: Since any states o f an LFSR w ill occur only once (per a period), thus
»a p-i)* corresponding to a particular value o f (a 1,a 2,.. . ,a p_l), 
is equal to 1. On the other hand, for all ip, the number o f ones in the ipth component is 
equal to 2p~l and the number o f zeros is equal to 2p~l - 1 .  Thus, either nh(ip) = 2p~l or 
nh (ip) =  2p~l - 1, which implies (since ex > 0 )
(1 -  2<r) < Nh(ip\ilJi2y...tip_l:(xl,a 2,...,a p_l) = 1 < (1 +  2d).
3.8 Summary
In this chapter statistical tests, to assess the random behaviour o f a sequence, are studied. 
It should be noted that there is a case where a particular sequence may satisfactorily pass all 
the applied tests but is still weak from the point o f view o f cryptography. A s discussed 
earlier, one o f the most remarkable classes of such sequences are the m-sequences and the 
weakness which they suffer from is predictability. In Chapter 4, we consider complexity 
measures that are used to study unpredictability o f sequences.
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CHAPTER 4
Complexify
The m-sequences, which satisfactorily pass the statistical tests, are weak from the point o f  
view  o f cryptography. The main weakness o f the m-sequences is their predictability. 
Although the statistical tests are necessary to investigate whether a sequence has desirable 
characteristics to be a candidate as the keystream, they are not sufficient tests. Another 
desirable property o f a sequence is its unpredictability. A  commonly used approach in 
measuring unpredictability is to use complexity measure. In order to measure the 
complexity o f a sequence, a value, with respect to a particular complexity measure, will be 
computed for the sequence. The sequence is then complex (with respect to the particular 
complexity measure) if  it satisfies the minimum acceptable complexity which is associated 
with that com plexity measure. A  sequence may be very com plex, with respect to a 
particular complexity measure, but obtains a low complexity value with respect to another 
complexity measure.
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4.1 Complexity Measures
Generally a com plexity measure determines to what degree a sequence exhibits a certain 
property. Different complexity measures denote different properties o f the sequences. The 
high value o f a complexity measure, with respect to a particular property, indicates that the 
sequence strongly exhibits that property. There is no unique measure to reflect security of 
a sequence.
A  sequence, S, is considered more random or unpredictable than sequence, T, if  the 
number o f  patterns in S be less than the number of patterns in T [Chaitin, 1966]. One o f  
the methods which has been proposed to compute the complexity o f a sequence using this 
criterion, is the length o f the shortest program needed to run on a Turing machine to 
produce the sequence. Another approach in evaluating the complexity of a finite sequence 
is  proposed by Ziv and Lempel [Ziv and Lempel, 1976]. They characterised the 
randomness o f a finite sequence by the number o f distinct words appearing in the 
sequence. Another well-known method to measure unpredictability o f a sequence (finite or 
periodic) is the length o f the shortest linear feedback shift register that can produce the 
sequence. This length, which is referred to as linear complexity, can be computed by an 
efficient synthesis procedure (the Berlekamp-Massey LFSR synthesis algorithm) [Massey, 
1969].
4.2 Turing-Kolmogorov-Chaitin Complexity
The Turing-Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity measure determines the length of the shortest 
program which is needed to run on a Turing machine to produce the sequence. Consider a 
binary sequence o f few thousand bits. If there is some recurring pattern in the sequence it
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m ight be possible to save the sequence in a more compact form. For exam ple, the 
sequence 5  = 101100111000... can be generated by a program whose length is small, 
compared to the length o f the sequence. However, if  the sequence does not consist o f  
regular patterns then the program in general will be longer, and in the very patternless case 
there is no better way to generate the sequence than by just storing and writing the whole 
sequence. Thus the length o f the program is an indication o f the randomness o f the 
sequence. Shorter programs correspond to more regular sequences [Chaitin, 1966]. In 
spite o f the fact that the Turing-Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity measure is theoretically 
interesting, it is not very useful in practice, because no algorithm exists to compute it for a 
given sequence.
4.3 Zi v-Lempel Complexity
Ziv-Lempel complexity, which was mainly used in data compression, was firstly proposed 
by Ziv and Lem pel [Ziv and Lem pel, 1976]. In this method a given sequence 
5  = sl9s2,...,sn is scanned from left to right, and a new word is added to a list every time a
substring o f consecutive elements not previously encountered is discovered. The number 
o f words in the compiled list, determines the Ziv-Lempel complexity o f the sequence 5 .
Let 5  =  sl,s2i...ysn be a sequence. 5(i, j )  denotes a substring o f 5  (5(i, j )  c  5 ), which  
starts at position i and ends at position j ,  where n >  j  > i > 1.
The algorithm for computing the Ziv-Lempel complexity of a sequence o f length n is:
1. Ziv_Lempel(sequence, ri)
2 . IF ft > 0 THEN /  / there will be exist at least one word
3 . c <— 1; i <— 2; /  !c denotes the Ziv_ Lempel complexity
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4 . ELSE RETURN(O);
5 . ENDIF;
6 . WHILE(/ < n) DO
7- j  <— i 11 to find anew word
8 - WHILE( S(i, j )  c  5(1, j  - 1 )  AND j  < n) DO
9 - j * - j  + 1;
10. ENDWHILE; 11 new word (or end o f sequence) has found
11. i<— j  + U c<—c + 1; / 1 increase the complexity
12. ENDWHILE;
13. RETURN(c);
14. END Ziv_ Lempel;
The Ziv-Lempel complexity o f the sequence is now determined by the number o f words 
which are processed by the algorithm. To illustrate the computation o f Ziv-Lempel 
com plexity, let 5  = 0001101001000101, be the sequence which is subjected to the 
algorithm. To indicate a new word we insert a delimiter, such as V , into the sequence.
Step i j c List
2 to 5 2 1 0.001101001000101
7 to 10 2 2,3,4 1
11 5 4 2 0 .001.101001000101
7 to 10 5 5,6 2
11 1 6 3 0 .001.10.1001000101
7 to 10 1 7,8,9 3
11 10 9 4 0 .001.10. 100.1000101
7 to 10 10 10,...,14 4
11 15 14 5 0 .001.10.100. 1000.101
7 to 10 15 15,16,17 5
11 18 6 0 .001. 10.100. 1000.101
Table 4 .3 .1  An example o f computation o f Ziv-Lempel complexity.
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Table 4.3.1 shows that the Ziv_Lempel Complexity o f the given sequence, S, is equal to 
6 . The sequence, 0.001.10.100.1000.101, is called the exhaustive history o f the S [Ziv 
and Lempel, 1976]. Ziv and Lempel showed that the complexity, C(S),  for a sequence S 
o f length n is upper bounded as follows:
C (S )< --------- - --------- ,
(1 - e n) Login)
where,
e  _ 2 1 + Lo8(L°8(2nV
" Log(n) '
They also proved that the expected complexity for a sequence o f length n is:
C(S)> n (1 _  0 (Log(Log(n)) 
Login) Login)
According to the above definition o f complexity almost all sequences o f sufficiently large 
length, n , are complex. For instance m-sequences are complex. Consider an m-sequence 
o f length n =  2* - 1  (produced by k cell registers). Thus n +1 = 2 \  and k = Login + 1).
Since every state o f the LFSR is unique, in partitioning the sequence into blocks o f length 
k w e would have n lk  distinct blocks, with the possible exception o f the last one. 
Therefore, the number o f distinct words in an m-sequence o f length n is at least n! k, 
thus:
C(S) > —--------! — .
k Login +1)
which is greater than the expected complexity.
Mund has investigated the lower bound of the Ziv-Lempel complexity [Mund, 1991]. The 
minimum value o f the Ziv-Lempel complexity is equal to two and it belongs to the case 
S =  0 0 ...0 0 , S =  00 ...01 , S = 11...11, or S = 11...10 (it is assumed that the length o f the 
sequence is greater than one).
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4.4 Linear Complexity
The Linear com plexity measure is perhaps the most w ell known com plexity measure. 
Since shift registers are generally used to generate keystreams, cryptanalysts also take the 
properties o f shift registers to cryptanalyse the sequences. A  powerful tool to attack a 
stream cipher system is to use the efficient synthesis procedure, proposed by Berlekamp-
M assey [Massey, 1969], to find the shortest LFSR that is able to generate the PR sequence 
used in cryptosystem. The algorithm processes a given sequence, S = si9s2,...9sm9 starting 
from ij. In processing the elem ent $. it determines the shortest LFSR, and its 
corresponding characteristic polynomial, that is able to produce sl9s29...9si; thus at the end
o f the algorithm the shortest LFSR, and its corresponding characteristic polynomial, that 
can produce the sequence S = s{,s2,...,sn will be determined. This length, the length of the
shortest LFSR that is able to produce a given sequence is called the linear complexity o f the 
sequence. Equivalently the linear complexity is the smallest positive integer L such that 
there e x ists  a linear recurence w ith fixed  constants cl9c29...9cL sa tisfy in g  
Sj + c lsl+ ...+cLsj_L = 0 , L <  j < n .  [Rueppel, 1992].
The Berlekam p-M assey algorithm finds the characteristic polynomial o f a LFSR o f
minimum length that is able to produce a given binary sequence. The algorithm recursively 
works on the sequence. Let S = sl9s2,...tsn be a sequence and let c(x) = c0 +  clx+...+cLx L
be the characteristic polynomial at position /, 1 < i < n ,  that is,
where L is  the linear com plexity when s{ is considered and cjt 0 <  j < L -  \ a r e  
coefficients o f the c{x).  In processing the next element, si+i9 either,
L- 1
7=0
L- 1
¿̂+1 = 2 1  CjSt+l~L+j 
7=0
L- 1
or s «  *  X
7=0
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Let i < k < n  be the first position in S so that:
L-l
Sk ^  ^ Cj Sk-L + j  *
;=0
If ^ < 2L then there exists a LFSR with the same length ( L), which is able to produce the 
sequences sl,s2,...,sk_l and s1,s2,...,sk_l,sk. Otherwise a longer LFSR is needed [Massey, 
1969].
4.4.1 The Berlekamp-Massey LFSR Synthesis Algorithm
The Berlekamp-Massey LFSR synthesis algorithm for computation the linear complexity o f  
sequence, S = si ,s2,...,sny [s as follows:
1 . Berlekamp_ Massey (sequence, n)
/  /  initialization
m<— 0 ; ! ¡the last linear complexity jump was at position m
lm <r- 0 ; IIlinear complexity at position m 
cm (x) <— x -1 ; / 1 characteristic polynomial at position m 
L<— 0 ; /, <— 0; cf (x) <— 1; II ith - element is under process
FOR i <— 1 TO n DO /  /  mam loop of the algorithm to consider si
2 .
3.
4 .
5.
6 .
7 .
8.
9 .
10. 
11. 
12.
13.
14.
d  * -
;=0
IF d  =  0  THEN CONTINUE; /  /  LFSR can produce s, a/sa  
ELSE /  / LFSR can produce sp ..., j ,._j , nai 5,
lt <r- MAX(L, i - L );
/ ( x )  < - x (/i' L)c;(x) +  x (ii_'+1+m"/'n)cm(x);
ENDIF;
IF L > — THEN cf(x) = / ( x ) ; /  /  length of LFSR will not change 
2
15. ELSE /  la  longer LFSR is required
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16. lm * - L ;  c j x )  c,(x);
17. DegreeX f(x))\
18. ENDIF;
19. ENDDO;
20. RETURN(Cj(x)); 11 returns the characteristic polynomial
21. END Berlekamp_ Massey;
Fig. 4.4.1 The Berlekamp-Massey LFSR synthesis algorithm.
To illustrate how the Berlekamp-Massey LFSR synthesis algorithm works, let S = 10100, 
be the sequence, which is subjected to the algorithm. Fig. 4.4.2 illustrates the working of 
the algorithm.
i Si d m cm(x) lm L cf(x ) a n d  c o n n e cte d  L F S R
0 1 / X 0 0 1
, r ~
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 l  + x <r~L l | J
2 0 1 X <r~m
3 1 1 2 X 1 2 l  + x 2 - i 10
4 0 0
5 0 1 4 l  + x 2 2 3 3X
1 0 1 ^^
Fig 4.4.2 An example of computation of B erlekamp-Massey algorithm.
The above LFSR can produce the sequence 10100 but in continuation, all the following 
elements are zeros (i.e. the output is as 1010000...). In practice the LFSRs are expected to 
produce the keystreams repetitively. In order to make the algorithm applicable to finding a 
LFSR which is able to produce a given sequence repetitively, it is enough to modify the 
algorithm at step 7 by changing FOR i <— 1 TO n DO, into FOR i <— 1 TO 2n - 1  DO.
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But note, Sj, where j  > n is Sj_n. Continuation of the algorithm (with i =  6 ) will produce 
the following shortest LFSR.
—
r t
i 0 i 0
The characteristic polynomial is f ( x )  =  1 + x  + x 2 +  x 3 +  x \  which indicates that the linear 
complexity of the sequence 5 = 10100, as a periodic sequence, is 4. Henceforth, all 
sequences which are given to the Berlekamp-Massey LFSR synthesis algorithm are 
considered periodic. Thus the linear complexity of a sequence determines the length o f  the 
shortest LFSR that is able to produce the given sequence periodically.
In order to protect cryptosystems against LFSR synthesis attack by the cryptanalyst, we 
have tried to consider sequences for which the Berlekamp-Massey LFSR synthesis 
algorithm is more time-consuming. It has been shown that the time complexity function of 
the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm formally is 0 (n 2) [Blahut, 1983]. An improved
algorithm, suggested by Blahut and called "recursive Berlekamp-Massey algorithm", has 
the time complexity greater than 0 (n L o g {h )) . Therefore, sequences with a long period
might take a long time. However, this is not the case for a sequence such as 5 = 00...01, 
which consists of a large number of zeros followed by a one. In this case the main part of 
the algorithm is computed only once, which is not desirable from the point of view of 
making the algorithm time-consuming. We note that, this sequence has the maximum 
linear complexity which is equal to the length of the sequence, and its characteristic 
polynomial is 1 + x n where n is the length of the sequence. This is the most frequently 
cited example criticising linear complexity measure, as in spite of the very high linear 
complexity (with respect to the length of the sequence) the sequence is not unpredictable. 
On the other hand, Ziv-Lempel complexity of this sequence is at its minimum, that is, it is 
equal to two (see 4.3).
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The most time-consuming part of the algorithm in Fig. 4.4.1 is related to the situation when 
d *  0 (lines 11 and 12 of algorithm) and the linear complexity is below the n i l  line (lines 
16 and 17 of algorithm ). This is a situation in which the linear com plexity  ju m p s to a  
position  above the n / 2 line. The amount of jump depends on L — ( n l  2). For instance if 
at ith  iteration of the algorithm, L  = (j / 2) -  a ,  the jump will be equal to 2 a ,  which 
means a jump in L  from ( ( / / 2 ) - a )  to ( ( / /2)  + a ) . To make the algorithm time­
consuming, many jumps must be created. In order to make the number of jumps maximum 
the linear com plexity o f  the sequence must grow  approxim ately as n/2, where n denotes the 
num ber o f  p ro ce sse d  bits.
It has been shown that the linear complexity profile of the truly random sequences closely 
follows the n l  2 line [Rueppel, 1984]. Rueppel compares the linear complexity profile of 
PN sequences associated with the characteristic polynomial, f ( x )  =  1 +  x 2 +  x 5 (Fig. 
4.4.3) and the linear complexity profile of a sequence obtained by 31 tosses of a fair Swiss 
coin and concludes that a “typical” random sequence will have a linear complexity profile 
closely following the n / 2 line.
Fig. 4.4.3 Linear complexity profile of a PN sequence.
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However, the sequences whose linear complexity profile stays very close to the n / 2 line 
will not always exhibit good statistical properties [Rueppel, 1984]. For instance, the 
sequence S whose terms are defined as,
5 = f1 if J = 2 " - l  n = 0,1,2,...
[ 0 otherwise
is not random looking, but it has a linear complexity profile following the n / 2 line as 
closely as is possible at least for n < 127 (and Rueppel conjectures for all n ) Fig. 4.4.4.
Fig. 4 . 4 . 4  Linear complexity profile which follows n/2 line.
We will show that this sequence for any n follows the n /2  line.
Lemma: 4.4.1
Let S = sl,s2,...,sn be a sequence with linear complexity L. The longest gap of the 
sequence S has length L - 1.
Proof: The linear complexity of S is the length of the shortest LFSR that can
produce the sequence S. Since state all zeros will never occur, the longest gap in LFSR of 
length L has length L — 1.
Theorem: 4.4.1
The linear complexity of sequence S whose terms are defined as,
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s = il if 7 = 2” - 1  tz =  0 , 1, 2 ,...
1 [ 0  otherwise
follows the n /  2 line.
Proof. The sequence S =  1101000100000001... for any arbitrary value o f n > 0 ,
has a one at position sr  with 2""1 - 1  zeros preceding it. Thus the linear complexity at
position 2” is at least 2”"1 - 1  +1  = 2”_1.
4.4.2 Theoretical Results
One o f the most important characteristics of a truly random sequence is its unpredictability 
and the most accepted parameter for estimating the unpredictability o f a sequence is the 
linear complexity. Let S = sl9s29...9sH be a sequence o f length n produced by a binary
symmetric source. The expected linear complexity o f the sequence S is given by the 
following formula [Rueppel, 1984],
C ^ = » + ± ^ W _ 2- ( »  + 2 ) t
2 18 3 9
where denotes the remainder o f n when divided by 2. Thus the expected linear 
com plexity, o f  a randomly selected sequence is close to n i l .  The expected linear 
complexity for sequences with long period is given by,
c ( 3 ) = » + £ ± M ! > .
2 18
The variance o f the linear complexity o f a sequence, S = sv s2,...,sn, produced by a binary 
symmetric source is given by,
Var(S) =  ^  -  2 — ( I z M O  „ +  82
w  81 27 81
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where /^ (n ) denotes the remainder o f n when divided by 2. For a sequence with long 
period the variance o f the linear complexity is given by,
Var(S) =  —  •
81
4.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of Complexity Measures
In this section strengths and weaknesses o f the complexity measures w ill be discussed. 
The main weakness o f the Turing-Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity measure is that there is 
no algorithm to compute it for a sequence. Thus we only consider linear complexity and 
Ziv-Lempel complexity.
The obvious weakness o f the Ziv-Lempel complexity is that almost all sequences of 
sufficiently large length are complex. For instance according to the Ziv-Lempel complexity 
measure the m-sequences are complex. In contrast the expected linear complexity for a PR 
sequence is higher than n /  2 (where n is the length o f the sequence). Since the linear 
complexity o f an m-sequence with period 2* - 1  is k y and k < (2* - 1) /  2 for k > 2 , thus 
the linear com plexity o f m-sequences is well below the expected value. Figure 4.4.3  
shows the linear complexity profile o f the PN sequence associated with the characteristic 
polynomial f {x)  =  1 +  x2 +  x5 and initial state ( 1,0 ,0 ,0 ,0).
However, the most frequently cited example criticising linear complexity measure is that the 
sequence o f  length n with repeated zeros followed by one, has the maximum linear 
com plexity, which is equal to the length o f the sequence. The Ziv-Lempel complexity 
however, assigns the minimum complexity to such sequence. Thus the strength o f the Ziv- 
Lem pel com plexity is that it can detect the repeated patterns within a sequence. Figure
47
CHAPTER 4
4.5.1 shows the linear complexity profile associated with the sequence S = 00...001 which 
consists of 30 zeros followed by a one.
A complexity measure is said to be consistent with respect to a transformation, T , if 
C(S) = C(T(S)) for all sequences, S. If the original sequence has a high value for a 
complexity measure but its reversal receives a low value for the same measure then the 
cryptanalyst can utilise the reversed sequence to obtain some information about the 
cryptosystem. Also if the complement of a sequence, obtained by replacing one and zero 
by zero and one respectively in a sequence, receives a low complexity value in comparison 
with the original sequence, then this weakness may help the cryptanalyst to obtain some 
information by analysing the complement of the ciphertext Furthermore, it is expected that 
a complexity measure be consistent with respect to a shift of the sequence (circular shift).
Fig. 4.5.1 Linear complexity profile of a sequence S=00...001 of length 31. 
Theorem 4.5.1 (this theorem originaly proved in [Erdmann, 1992], we give an
alternative proof)
The Ziv-Lempel complexity is,
a) consistent with respect to complementation;
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b) not consistent with respect to reversal;
c) not consistent with respect to a shift.
Proof.
a) The Ziv-Lempel complexity o f a sequence is the number of components which exist 
in the exhaustive history o f the sequence. Let C(S) = k{ , C{&) = k2 and C ( i )  = k3 ,
where & and i  denote the complement of S and & respectively. Every component o f the 
exhaustive history o f a sequence, with the possible exception o f the last one, is distinct. 
Since the Ziv-Lempel complexity looks only at words, and complement o f different words 
are different, thus ^  < k2 < k3. But S = i  implies that kl = k 3 and consequently k{ = k2,
which means the number o f components in exhaustive history o f a sequence and its 
complement is the same.
b) To show that the Ziv-Lempel complexity measure is not consistent with respect to 
reversal, it is sufficient to give an example. Let S = 1000 be the original sequence. Then
O O
its reversal is given by S = 0001. The Ziv-Lempel complexities o f sequences S and S are 
equal to 3 and 2 respectively (which obviously are not the same).
c) To show that the Ziv-Lempel complexity measure is not consistent with respect to 
shift, it is sufficient to give an example. Let S = 0001 be the original sequence and 
S =  0010 be the shifted sequence S by one shift (circular shift). The Ziv-Lem pel 
complexities associated with the sequences S and S are 2 and 3 respectively (again which 
are not clearly the same).
In [Erdmann, 1992] the following theorem is proved for finite sequences.
Theorem 4 .5 .2
The linear complexity of periodically repeated sequence is,
a) not consistent with respect to complementation;
b) consistent with respect to reversal;
c) consistent with respect to a shift
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Proof.
a) To show  that the linear com plexity is not consistent with respect to the 
complementation it is sufficient to give an example. Let S = 001 be the original sequence 
and let ^ = 110 be its complement. The linear complexity o f S is 3 (with the characteristic 
polynomial f ( x )  =  1 +  x 3), but the linear complexity o f the sequence ^ is 2 (with the 
characteristic polynomial g (x ) = 1 +  x + x2).
o
b) Let S = sl,s2,...,sn and S = sn,sn_x be a sequence and its reversal respectively,
and let L be the linear complexity of S. Thus L is the smallest number such that
Si+L ~ V i  l̂ î+l"L*• » 1 ^ i ^ n — L, (1)
for all / . But note that, c0 = 1 , otherwise si+L is producible by its L - l  preceding
elements. Thus we have:
Si = C0Si+L ^L-l î+L-l"L• *"̂ "̂ 'l'̂ i+l » 1 ^ ^ W — L, (2)
o
which means every element o f S = sn,sn_l,...ys1 is producible by its L preceding elements.
o
In order to prove that the linear complexity of S is L it is necessary to prove that L is the 
smallest integer that satisfies the equation (2). Suppose there exists an integer k < L , such
o
that si =  c0si+k + ck_lsi+k_l+...+c1sM , 1 < i < n - £ ,  that is the linear complexity o f S is k 
and c0 =  1, which implies:
■V* = V i  +  V i +i + - + c*-A +t-i , l < i < n - k .  (3)
But equation (3) is in contrast to equation (1), and thus k - L .
Let f {x)  be the characteristic polynomial o f Sy then the characteristic polynomial o f the 
sequence S is  f*(x)  = x L/ ( j ^ ) .  The characteristic polynomial f*(x)  is called the
reciprocal polynomial o f f {x) .
c) Let the linear complexity o f the sequence S = sl,s2,...,sn be equal to L . Then there 
exists an LFSR which is able to produce the sequence S repetitively. This means that each 
elem ent o f the sequence S is determined by its L preceding elem ents. Consider the
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sequence S — si,si+l,...,sn,sl,...,si_l , which is obtained by shifting o f the sequence S. Each
element o f the sequence S is still determined by its L preceding elements, which means the 
linear complexity of the sequence S is equal to L.
4.6 Summary
W e have studied a possible way o f making the Berlekamp-M assey LFSR synthesis 
algorithm more time-consuming and concluded that the most desirable sequences for this 
purpose are those sequences for which the linear complexity of the sequence stays close to 
the n /  2 line where n denotes the number of processed bits. Linear complexity profile o f  
the truly random sequences closely follows the n i l  line [Rueppel, 1984]. A  sequence 
whose linear complexity profile stays very close to the n /  2 line w ill not always exhibit 
good statistical properties. For instance, the sequence S whose terms are defined as,
fl if  7 = 2" — 1, n = 0 ,1,2 ,...
s j i
[0  otherwise,
is not a typical sequence but has a linear complexity profile following the n /  2 line. Our 
study suggests that linear complexity measure in combination with statistical tests provide a 
strong criterion for unpredictability. Note that the statistical tests and complexity measures 
are not the only major cryptographic criteria related to stream ciphers. Another major 
criteria is whether a keystream generator is secure against correlation attacks. In 
[Seignthaler, 1984] a class o f key generators consisting o f n subgenerators and a 
combining function /  has been investigated. It has been pointed out that the weakness o f  
these generators is the statistical dependence between a subgenerator sequence (or between 
pairs, triples, etc., o f sequences) and the keystream. It has been shown also the key 
generator can sometimes be broken by correlation attacks on individual sequences.
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CHAPTER 5
Cryptographically Strong PR Sequences
The pseudo-noise (PN) sequences, which satisfactorily pass the Golomb's randomness 
postulates, are considered in Chapter 2. An LFSR of length L is said to be a maximal 
length LFSR if, when started in a non-zero state, generates an m-sequence o f period 
p  = 2L - 1 .  A s has been discussed, the m-sequences are very predictable and consequently
they are not suitable from the point o f view  o f cryptography. This is because the m- 
sequences have the minimum linear complexity with respect to their lengths. In fact an m- 
sequence o f period p  =  2L - 1  has the linear complexity L, and there exists no sequence 
with a period longer than 2h - 1  which has a linear complexity equal to L.
In order to produce PR sequences with large linear complexity, non-linear transformations 
are applied to m-sequences. One o f the simplest non-linear transformations is the bitwise 
product o f two sequences. Let *i and x 2 be two binary variables, x1x2 as the product o f  
these two variables is given by,
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il i f x = j c 2 =l ,
xxx2 = <
[ 0 otherwise.
Th zorder of a product is the number of variables in the multiplication. For instance, xxx2 
is a product of order two while x1x2x3 is a product of order three. In general, a product of 
order n is defined as follows:
1 i fx] = x2 =...= xn = 1,
0 otherwise.
To illustrate the non-linearity of the binary product observe that for binary variables xl , x2y
yi and y2,
(x, + yx){x2 + y2) = x1x2 + XJ2 + ytx2 + y j 2 *  x,x2 + y,y2 , 
where addition is in modulo two. In this chapter, the product of two or more sequences 
will be considered as a non-linear transformation. A non-linear function, / ,  over the states 
of a maximal-length LFSR is shown in Fig. 5.1. Let /  is defined as follows:
f  > x2, X3, X̂  ) X2 X3X̂ ,
thus, the output sequence is bitwise product of the first, third and the fourth components of 
the m-sequence associated with the characteristic polynomial, 1 + x3 + x4.
T
<- 1 0 0 0 f -
N _i' _V ' _^
f
<-------------
Let
Kn j
Fig. 5.1
A maximal-length LFSR associated with the characteristic polynomial 1 + x3 + x4
filtered by a non-linear function f.
denotes the number of possible ways of selection n elements from m elements,
which is given by the following formula:
rwi\ m \
Kn )  n\(m -n)\ '
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5.1 Multiplication of Components of M-sequences
It has been shown that, when the characteristic polynomial associated with an LFSR is 
primitive, the LFSR has the maximum period = 2L -1 ,  where L is the length of the 
LFSR. The sequences obtained by taking the output from each cell register have the same 
period. Moreover, the m-sequence associated with cell register /, 1 < i < Ly is the same as 
the m-sequence associated with cell register j, 1 < j  < L ? but with (j -  i) time-units shift. 
The m-sequence associated with the cell register /, 1 < i < Ly is called the component /. 
The component 1 is usually taken as output sequence (associated with a particular LFSR). 
The number of components is equal to the number of cell registers.
Suppose an LFSR has length L = 4. Let the primitive polynomial f (x)  = 1 + x 3 + x4 be 
the characteristic polynomial and let (1,0,0,0) be the initial state. Thus, the period of the 
m-sequence associated with this LFSR will be equal to p = 24 — 1 = 15. Since the length of 
the LFSR is 4, then four components will exist (Fig. 5.1.1).
7 “
1 0 0 0 <-
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0
1
3 0
component 1
1
-> component 4
component 2 component 3
F i g . 5 . 1 . 1  Components of an m-sequence.
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Since the number of components is four, the maximum order of the component product is 
also four. In this section only single product, without any addition, is considered. For 
instance x1x2x3 is a single product, while x1x2x3 + xlx3 is not. The number of possible
products of order two (for four elements) is equal to
f 4 \
W
= 6, which are: c\c29c\c\,
* & ,V 3, 2̂̂ 4 c3c4 where ci denotes the component /. The single product c2c4 is a 
sequence obtained by bitwise product of the components two and four. The number of 
possible products of order 3 is equal to 4 and the number of possible products of order 4 is 
one. Four components of the above maximal-length LFSR and their possible single 
products are shown in Table 5.1.1.
Single Product First period produced by single product term
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
¿2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
c3 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
c a 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
cxc3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
cxcA 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
2̂̂ 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
c2c4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
C3C4 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
c{c2c3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
^1^2  ̂4 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C]C3C4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
c2c3c4 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CiC2C3C4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5 .1 .1  Single product of components of an m-sequence.
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It has been shown that the order o f a non-linear function plays a key role in the 
determination of the linear complexity of the produced sequences [Rueppel, 1984]. Let a
non-linear function consists of a single product term of order k applied to states of an 
LFSR. The linear complexity of S = c]{ci2...cik is then upper bound by,
1(3-
where L is the length of the LFSR. Thus, the linear complexity of sequences correspond 
to the second-order product is upper bound by,
= 4 + 6 = 10,
the linear complexity of sequences correspond to the third-order product is upper bound
by,
¿ ( J j - 4 + 6 + 4 - 1 4 .
and the linear complexity of sequences correspond to the fourth-order product is upper 
bound by,
¿ ^  = 4 + 6 + 4 + 1 = 15,
which is equal to the length of the sequence and consequently the maximum possible linear 
complexity. Thus, multiplication of components of m-sequences can be used to produce
sequences with high linear complexity. Fig. 5.1.2 shows the generation of a non-linear 
sequence associated with c{cjc4m
F i g . 5 . 1 . 2  Generation of a non-linear sequence.
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5.2 Properties of Product Sequences
In this section som e properties o f sequences, which are produced by applying product 
transformation, w ill be discussed. W e will show that the single product o f components o f  
m-sequences produces a sequence with high linear complexity, but the obtained sequence 
has low  statistical properties.
Theorem 5 .2 .1
The k th -  order product o f components o f a maximal-length LFSR of length L has 2L~k 
ones.
Proof: Let cn ,<~2,...,<?* be k distinct components associated with a maximal-length
LFSR. The number o f occurrences o f ones in the product sequence S = cfci2...cik is 
determined by the JV, = ( /a lin,if2,...,i#_ , : 1,1, . . . ,1), which is equal to (see  3 .7 ).
Since c]k is an m-sequence then the number o f ones within c] is given by nY (iik) = 2 i_1
and consequently — ̂  = 2 i ~1_*+1 = 2h~k.
2
Thus the larger the order o f product the lower the number o f ones in the produced 
sequence. This means that, although the higher order products, produce a sequence with 
higher linear complexity, the sequence obtained is weak from the point o f view of statistical 
properties.
Corollary:
The L th -order  product o f all L components of an maximum-length LFSR always 
produces a sequence with maximum linear complexity 2L - 1.
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Pwofi The number o f ones within the produced sequence o f Lth -  order product
is equal to 2 L L =  1 (see Theorem 5.2.1). Thus the linear com plexity o f the produced 
sequence is equal to the length o f the sequence, which is a pure cycling shift register o f  
length 2 L - 1  .
From the point o f  view  o f  cryptography the Lth — order product is o f little value (see 
Chapter 4). This indicates that non-linear transformations which only utilise high-order 
products are cryptographically unsuitable.
5.3 Addition of Sequences
In this section addition o f sequences (bitwise addition) is considered. The addition is in 
modulo two. Thus, addition o f n binary variables xY,x2,...,xn is given by,
f 1 if  odd number o f x s  are equal to 1,
X + X + ,. . . ,+ X , = -s
[ 0 otherwise.
It has been shown that for sequences (not necessarily m-sequences) Sv S2,...ySk w ith  
characteristic polynomials / i ( * ) , / 2(* ),•••,/*(*), if  polynomials / i ( x ) , / 2(* ) ,... ,/* (* ) , are 
pairwise relatively prime, then the characteristic polynomial o f the sum Sl +S2+...+Sk 
(addition in modulo 2) is equal to the product f l{x )f2(x )...fk(x) [Lidl and Niederreiter, 
1986].
It is also shown that, a pure cycling shift register of length 2L - 1, with characteristic 
polynom ial 1 +  x  , can be decom posed into distinct LFSRs w ith irreducible 
characteristic polynomials [Rueppel, 1984]. For instance the polynomial 1 +  x 15 can be 
factored into the following irreducible polynomials:
(1 +  x 15) =  (1 +  x){\ +  x + x2)(l +  x3 +  jc4)(1 + x +  jc4)(1 +  x + x2 +  x 3 +  x4).
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Thus, addition of sequences, which are produced by the LFSRs associated with the above 
irreducible polynomials, will produce a sequence with characteristic polynomial 
(1 + x)(l + x + x2)(l + x + x 4)(l + x3 + x 4)(l + x + x2 + x3 + x 4) = l + x15, 
and the linear complexity 15.
To illustrate the addition of sequences, consider the LFSRs of Fig. 5.3.1 with arbitrary 
initial states. Although, the sequences, which are produced by addition of the sequences 
are dependent on the initial states of the LFSRs, the linear complexities are the same.
F i g . 5 . 3 . 1  Decomposition of a pure cycling shift register.
The sequence which is produced by the above addition of sequences is shown in Table 
5.3.1. This enables ones to generate a sequence with arbitrary linear complexity. For 
instance to produce a sequence with the linear complexity 7, the first two LFSRs 
(corresponding to 1 + x, and 1 + x + x2,) and one of the three remaining LFSRs of length 4 
are needed. However, if 2L - 1  is prime then the polynomial 1 + x2/1-1 can be factored into 
the polynomials of degree L or degree 1 [Rueppel, 1984]. For instance, when L = 5 then 
2^ — 1 = 31 and
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1 + x31 = (l + x)(l + x2+ x 3+x* + x5)(l + x + x2 + X4 + x5)(l + x+X3 + X4 + X5) 
(1 + X2 + x5)(l + x + x 2+ x 3+ x 5)( l+x3 + X5),
Corollary:
The linear com plexity o f a sequence with period 2L - 1, where 2L - 1  is prime, w ill be
either kL or kL + 1, 0 < k < 2L — 1
L
characteristic polynomial
1 +  Xy
l  +  x  +  jc2,
1 +  x 3 +  x 4,
1 +  x  +  x 4,
1 +  X +  X2 +  X3 +  Jt4
the associated sequence
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ©
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 + x 15 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0  
T ab le 5 . 3 . 1  Addition of sequences.
5.4 Irrational Numbers as Key Generators
The aim o f applying non-linear functions is to produce unpredictable sequences. Since the 
weakness o f a non-linear function can be cryptographically dangerous, the main challenge 
is to select an appropriate non-linear function. In Chapter 6 , a non-linear function is 
proposed for parallel generation o f cryptographically strong PR sequences. In this section, 
w e consider a method o f  generating PR sequences using irrational numbers. Erdmann 
[Erdmann, 1992] comments on the usefulness o f irrational numbers.
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" We want a sequence that looks unpredictable. However a sequence may look 
unpredictable or patternless but still be weak cryptographically. For example, as Maurer 
(Maurer, 1990) points out, the binary expansion of n looks very unpredictable, however 
once the production method becomes known the sequence is easily reproducible."
But what Maurer says is true for every pseudo-random sequence also. The method we will 
consider in this work is applying a transformation to the decimal expansion of irrational 
numbers. The main advantage of this method is that we do not restrict ourselves to a 
unique binary sequence for each irrational number. Thus, by using different 
transformations one will be able to generate different binary sequences.
Before we consider the transformation, a brief definition of irrational numbers is presented. 
Rational numbers are those decimals which are either terminating or periodic; the irrational 
numbers are those which are non-periodic (i.e. n, e, etc.). For example, the following 
infinite series illustrates an irrational number, e [Niven, 1961].
. . I l l  e = 1+ — + — +
1! 2! 3!
In order to generate a binary sequence, a transformation function can be applied to the 
decimal expansion of an irrational number. Schematically the transformation function can 
be considered as follows:
Binary Sequence Decimal expansion
If irrational numbers serve as key generators for stream cipher systems, the amount of key 
information which is needed to be sent via a secure channel is small. Precisely, the amount
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o f information which is needed to be sent is an irrational number and a transformation 
function.
Although key representation is the basic advantage o f using LFSRs, the advantage o f using 
irrational numbers is that, there are infinitely many irrational numbers and their decimal 
expansions are non-periodic sequences. Moreovere, our experimental results shows that 
almost all irrational numbers, can be used to produce keystreams with good statistical 
properties and a high complexity value.
5.5 Experimental Results
Up to this point statistical tests and complexity measures have been considered. These are 
the tools to determine whether or not a sequence behaves randomly with respect to 
particular properties. Theoretically m-sequences satisfactorily pass the statistical tests, but 
are rejected from the point of view o f unpredictability (which can be estimated by the linear 
com plexity measure). Moreover, it is expected that high order products o f m-sequence 
com ponents w ill obtain a sequence with high linear com plexity but weak statistical 
properties. Two types of sequences will be considered for the tests.
In order to apply the non-linear product, the m-sequence associated with the characteristic 
polynomial f (x )  = 1 +  x2 + xn w ill be considered. It w ill generate an m-sequence o f  
period p  = 2n - 1  =  2047. The number of second-order products is equal to:
a n  i n  _ n x i o
^2 J “  2!9! “  2 " ’
and the number o f third-order product is:
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fUl 11!
3!8!
= 165.
Thus instead o f considering all possible products, which is equal to i i 1/) -  2047, only
one instance o f each particular order product will be considered.
In order to justify the potential o f the irrational numbers for producing cryptographically 
strong PR sequences, five binary sequences associated with five irrational numbers are 
presented. The irrational numbers chosen are n, e, V2, V3, and V 5 . W e had no bias in 
the selection o f these numbers; the first two are well-known irrational numbers and the rest 
are common irrational numbers. Also, no emphasis was placed on applying an appropriate 
transformation function. Because o f this, a very simple transformation is used in all cases. 
It is defined as follows:
i if  4  > 5 then bt = 1, 1 < / < 2047,
[otherwise bt = 0 ,
where d{ is the ith element o f the decimal expansion o f the irrational number and bt is its 
corresponding element in the binary sequence associated with the decimal expansion. For 
instance according to the above transformation the binary sequence, 00001011... w ill be 
associated with the decimal expansion, 31415197....
Name o f the Test Distribution Passing value
Frequency test X1 with degree of freedom 1 3.841
Serial test X2 with degree of freedom 2 5.991
Run test X2 with degree o f freedom 14 23.67
Poker test X2 with degree o f freedom 4 9.488
T ab le 5 . 5 . 1  Passing values for applied statistical tests.
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Before application o f the statistical tests it was observed that the acceptable values (if the 
sequence behaves randomly with probability 95%) are as in Table 5.5.1 ( c] denotes the
sequence associated with ith component o f a maximal length LFSR).The results shown in 
Table 5.5.2 indicate the behaviour of sequences with respect to the different tests.
No. Sequence Frequency
test
Serial
test
Run
test
Poker
test
Autocorre­
lation test
1 c[ /PN  sequence 0.00048 0.0014 0.0074 0.1217 100%
2 CjC2 /2nd-order 511.25 1533.75 234.54 650.87 1%
3 CjC2c3 /3rd-order 1151.06 3453.18 278.35 2268.65 0 %
4 q .. .c 4/4th-order 1567.01 4701.04 298.60 3858.51 0 %
5 ¿¡...c^ th-order 1799.00 5397.01 313.25 4978.53 0 %
6 cJ...Cg/6th-order 1921.00 5763.00 321.42 5537.30 0 %
7 £¡...£7/7 th-order 1983.50 5950.50 325.07 5782.66 0 %
8 q .. .c 8/8th-order 2015.12 6045.37 338.47 5970.30 0 %
9 cj...Cp/9th-order 2031.03 6093.09 408.44 6033.49 0 %
10 q . . .q 0/ 10th-ord. 2039.00 6117.02 682.02 6065.26 0 %
11 c\...cnl  llth-ord. 2043.00 6125.01 681.68 6097.09 0 %
12 n 0.82120 4.8475 13.9845 3.5804 95.9%
13 e 0.05911 0.93942 5.0480 2.3819 95.8%
14 V2 2.7479 5.8519 15.1407 5.0590 95.7%
15 V3 0.66878 2.24084 4.3568 3.1537 95.5%
16 V5 0.2154 3.7963 6.4318 6.0816 96.1%
Table 5 .5 .2  Results o f applying statistical tests.
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The autocorrelation test shows the percentage o f cases in which the sequence obtains 
acceptable values. For instance, the value, 100%, which corresponds to the first row o f  
Table 5.5.2 indicates that for all possible shifts, the PN sequence behaves randomly with 
respect to autocorrelation test. Meanwhile, for the 2nd-order product only 1% o f shifts 
produces random behaviour (with respect to the autocorrelation test). Table 5.5.2 shows 
that q  as a PN sequence satisfactorily passes all statistical tests.
Fig. 5.5.1 demonstrates that the autocorrelation function is a two valued function (see 2.5). 
The theoretical results for product sequences are confirmed by the experimental results o f 
Table 5.5.2. It is interesting to note that the irrational numbers selected without bias are 
able to generate binary sequences which satisfactorily pass all statistical tests.
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A s has been discussed, statistical tests are necessary to examine whether or not a sequence
behaves randomly, but they are not sufficient. Examination o f the sequences from the
point o f v iew  o f  unpredictability is necessary. According to the theoretical results o f
complexity measures, the acceptable value for the Ziv-Lempel complexity measure is:
n = 2047 ^ 2047
Log2(n + \) Log2(2048) 11 ’
and the acceptable value for the linear complexity measure is:
n
2
2047
2
«1023 .
W e note that, since 2047 is a prime number, the linear complexity o f all sequences o f  
length 2 11 - 1  = 2047 is either equal t o l l x f c  + l o r l l x f c  where l < k <  [ -^ r j •
Table 5.5.3 demonstrates the behaviour of sequences with respect to Ziv-Lempel and linear 
com plexity measures. As has been discussed (see Chapter 4), with respect to the linear 
complexity measure, a sequence is said to be complex if it obtains not only a value greater 
than the half o f the sequence length but also its linear complexity growth follows the n /  2 
line. A lso, we showed that such sequences when subjected to the Berlekamp-Massey 
LFSR synthesis algorithm, w ill have more linear complexity jumps and consequently 
consum e more time. Therefore, with respect to the linear com plexity measure, three 
parameters (Value, Jumps and CPU time, in seconds) for each sequence are investigated. 
Table 5.5.3 demonstrates that C\ as a PN sequence obtains the lowest linear complexity. 
Since the minimum acceptable value of the linear complexity is 1024, thus the sequences 
corresponding to Nos 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Table 5.5.3 are rejected (from the point o f view  
o f obtaining low  linear com plexity value). For the rest o f the ith -  order product, 
(6 < i < 11), however, the linear complexity value is acceptable, but the sequences are
rejected from the point o f view  o f the Ziv-Lempel complexity measure (these types o f the
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sequences, more precisely the last one, which was considered in Chapter 4 , are frequently 
cited examples critical of the linear complexity measure).
No Sequence
Ziv-Lempel
Complexity
Value
Linear Complexity
Value Jumps CPU time/sec.
1 ^  /PN  sequence 207 11 3 33
2 C1C2 /2nd-order 123 66 5 278
3 Cf2C3 /3rd-order 81 231 94 2123
4 <^...£4 /4th-order 47 561 206 5757
5 C1...C5 /5th-order 28 1023 383 14724
6 c\...c6 /6th-order 19 1485 605 26250
7 /7th-order 10 1815 603 25661
8 / 8th-order 8 1980 398 23700
9 Ĉ ...Cg /9th-order 6 2035 88 7890
10 C1...C10 / 10th-order 4 2046 3 47737
11 cl...cn /llth-order 4 2047 2 14
12 n 194 2046 1402 31581
13 e 198 2047 1043 31355
14 V2 193 2036 978 31518
15 V3 196 2036 993 31463
16 V5 196 2047 1031 31394
Table 5 .5 .3  Results o f applying complexity measures.
Again the interesting results o f Table 5.5.3 are related to the binary sequences associated 
with the decimal expansion of irrational numbers. It can be seen that the irrational numbers 
selected without bias are able to generate binary sequences which are com plex from the 
point o f view  o f the both Ziv-Lempel complexity and linear complexity. Moreover, the
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number o f linear complexity jumps, and consequently the time elapsed to run the algorithm 
are w ell greater than corresponding values for the rest o f the investigated sequences. In 
order to illustrate the results o f Table 5.5.3, linear complexity profiles associated with each 
investigated sequence are presented. The linear complexity profiles correspond to the 
binary sequences associated with irrational numbers confirm the potential o f irrational 
numbers for generating unpredictable sequences.
5.6 Some Other Generators
Non-linear operations on sequences with distinct characteristic polynomials have been 
considered by a number o f authors. Major contribution to this area has come from [Key, 
1976] and [Rueppel, 1984]. They have shown that in many cases the linear complexity 
and the statistics o f the input sequences w ill determine the linear com plexity and the 
statistics o f the output sequence. For example, if  the length o f two LFSRs are relatively 
prime, then the length o f the sequence obtained from non-linear combination o f the two 
sequences w ill be maximum. Key [Key, 1976] showed that the maximum linear 
complexity o f a sequence obtained from the product o f two sequences, whose complexities 
are 1̂  and Z ,̂ is equal to L where L = L ^ .
In this section we briefly describe a number o f keystream generators which have been 
proposed and published in the open literature. The non-linearity transformation used in the 
rest o f this chapter is based on the following model:
- / :  {0 , 1}” —> {0 , 1}'” denotes a mapping that maps an elem ent o f {0 , 1}” into an
element o f { 0 ,l} m and is defined by f (X )  = x , where X  is a variable that takes on values 
X{ e  {0 , 1}” and x  e  {0 , l}m.
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5.6.1 Clock-Controlled Shift Registers
An attractive method for generating keystreams is by using clock-controlled shift registers 
[Gollman and Chambers, 1989]. Two different types o f clock-controlled shift registers are 
studied: forward clock control and feedback clock control
- Forward Clock Control
In forward clock control a regularly clocked shift register is used to control the clock o f  
another shift register. Let Lc, with period Tc and Lg, with period Tg be the controlling
LFSR and the generating LFSR respectively. Also consider the mapping /: { 0 ,l} Lc —» Zj , 
where {0 , l } ic denotes the set o f binary sequences o f length Lc and denotes the ring o f  
integers modulo Tg. Then let X  be a random variable which takes on values Xt €  { 0 ,l} ie . 
The key (seed) consists o f the initial states, X0 and F0, o f the two LFSRs and the function 
/ .  The forward clock control algorithm for generating a keystream works as follows:
For i = l,2 ,...,n do
1. Clock LFSRC once and extract fiX ^ .
2. Clock LFSRg f { X {) times and extract Z; = y , where s{ denotes the 
accumulated sum of all clock pulses that have reached LFSRg at time i
od.
The sequence o f ZI? / = l,2 ,...,# i (for an arbitrary value of n) is the output o f the algorithm 
where X{ is the Ith state o f the controlling LFSR, ys_ is the s{h element o f the sequence 
created by LFSRg and,
* « = S /( * } ) •
The sequence is periodic with the maximum period T = TcTg. If f ( X i) = xi, where 
jtf e  {0 ,1}, then the generator is called a stop-and-go generator [Beth and Piper, 1985].
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This generator has poor cryptographic and statistical properties [Rueppel, 1992]. That is 
because whenever the keystream bit changes value from time i to time i + 1, one knows 
that the control register has emitted a 1. In order to improve the bad statistics o f the stop- 
and-go generator Gunther [Gunther, 1988] proposed the alternating step generator.
- Alternating step generator consists o f two stop-and-go generators that share the 
same control LFSR. Let X0, Y® and Y™ be the initial states o f the three LFSRs. The
algorithm works as follows:
For i = l,2 ,...,w  do
1. Clock LFSRC once and produce xr
2. If Xj;= 1 then shift LFSR̂  and produce y®,
otherwise shift LFSl\ and produce y ^ l .
3
od,
_i
where ^  x; . The output is the sequence o f Z(, i = 1 ,2 ,...,«  (for an arbitrary value o f
7=1
n). In [Gunther, 1988] it has been shown that the alternating step generator succumbs to a 
divide and conquer attack with respect to the control register.
- Feedback Clock Control
In feedback clock control, a shift register controls its own clock. W henever the output 
symbol is a zero, then d  clock pulses are applied to the LFSR. But in case that the output 
sym bol is a one, then k clock pulses are applied to the LFSR. The resulting sequence is 
called a (d-k)-self-decim ated  sequence. Let Lc be the length o f a LFSR with period Tc 
and consider the mapping / :  {0,1} —» 7^ . The key is the initial state Y0 o f the LFSR, a
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random integer sQ < Tc and the function / .  The algorithm for producing a ( d - k ) -self­
decimation sequence is as follows:
For i = 0 ,1 ,2 ,...,/! do
1. Extract Z, = ySj.
2. Apply f ( y Sj) clock pulses to LFSR and update s, using,
S;+i = Si + f ( ySi). 
od.
The output sequence is the sequence o f Z,, i = 0,1,2 ,...,n (for an arbitrary value o f n).
5.6.2 Geffe's Generator
G effe [Geffe, 1973] proposed a keystream generator using three LFSRs employing the 
non-linear com bining function / :  {0 , l }3 ->  {0, 1} defined by f ( x 1 ,x2,x3) = x &  0  
x2x3 0  x3. Each LFSR is associated with a primitive feedback polynomial and the lengths 
o f the LFSRs are pairwise relatively prime. Let X,0 be the initial state o f the LFSR, , 
i =  1,2,3. The algorithm o f Geffe's generator is as follows :
F orj = 1,2,...,n do
F ori = 1,2,3 do
1. Shift LFSR,,
extract x,j (applying/(X - ) = *••), 
od.
2. Zj =  xV]x2i 0  x2jx3j 0  x3j, 
od.
The output is the sequence o f Z; , j  = 1,2,...,n  (for an arbitrary value o f n), where Xi} is 
the state o f LFSR, and xi} €  {0,1} is the corresponding value o f / : { 0 ,1 } 3 —» {0,1}. Let 
T, and Lx denote the period and length o f LFSR,, i = 1,2,3. Then the period o f the output
72
CHAPTER 5
sequence is T = T{T2T3, and its linear complexity is L = +  L3. In [Rueppel,
1992] it has been shown that the non-linear function g :{0 ,l}3 {0,1} defined by
g(xl9x29x3) = x{x2 + x2x3 + x3xl9 which is a simple modification o f / ,  exhibits equally 
good statistical properties and has high linear complexity.
5.6.3 Threshold Generator
A  simple and efficient way o f obtaining keystreams, which employs M  linear feedback 
shift registers and a non-linear combination / ,  was proposed in 1984 by Bruer [Bruer,
1984]. The same as Geffe's generator, feedback polynomials o f each LFSR is primitive 
and the lengths Lr, i = 1 ,...,M , o f the LFSRs are pairwise relatively prime. Let Xi0 be the 
initial state o f the LFSR{, i =  1 ,2 ,...,M . The threshold generator algorithm is as follows : 
Forj  = l929...9n do
1. For j = l ,2 ,...,M  do 
shift LFSRi,
extract xi} by applying f { X i} ) = xijy 
od.
2. Calculate
Z,.=
M
1 r (E * )> f •i=1 Z
0 otherwise,
od.
The output is the sequence o f Z; , j  = 1 ,2 ,...,«  (for an arbitrary value o f n), where X{j is 
the j thstate o f LF5R, and e { 0 ,l}  is the corresponding value o f / : { 0 , 1}M —>{0 , 1} . .  
Although the generator generates a keystream with high linear com plexity and good  
statistical properties, but the sequence is cryptographically weak. The weakness is that, 
there exists correlation between the keystream and every input sequences [Rueppel, 1992].
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5.6.4 Summation Generator
Rueppel [Rueppel, 1986] investigated the suitability o f integer addition as a combining 
function. Let the input sequences be the binary expansion o f some integers and define the
M
sum function / :  ZM ->  Z to be Z = £ x i . Let Xj0 be the initial state o f the LFSRj with
i=1
length Lj and period Tj ( j  = 1 ,...,M ). The summation generator is as follow s (C 0 is the 
initial carry):
For i = l,2 ,... ,/ i  do
1. step each shift register once to produce Xu,X2i,...,XMi.
M
2. Calculate the integer sum 5- = ^  Xj{ + CM.
7=1
3. Sei
Zf = »S', mod 2
C  = .2
od.
The output sequence is the sequence o f Zf, / = l,2 ,...,n  (for an arbitrary value o f n). If the 
periods o f the individual LFSRs are pairwise relatively prime, then the output sequence
M
will be periodic with period T = . In [Rueppel, 1986] it has been shown that the real
7=1
sum o f M inputs provides a ( M - 1)'* order correlation-immune, which is the maximum 
possible order o f correlation immunity.
5.7 Summary
In order to produce cryptographically strong PR sequences, m ultiplication o f the 
components o f PN sequences is considered. The single product produces sequences with
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high linear com plexity, but the sequences obtained have poor statistical properties. We 
have also considered addition o f sequences, which enables one to produce sequences with 
an arbitrary linear complexity. Also, we introduced irrational numbers as key generators. 
The properties o f  the sequences associated with the decimal expansion o f irrational 
numbers are not theoretically analysed and only experimental results are reported. The 
interesting observation in this case is the high performance o f binary sequences associated 
with the decimal expansion o f irrational numbers with respect to both statistical tests and 
complexity measures.
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CHAPTER 6
Parallel Generation of Cryptographically Strong PR 
Sequences
W e have noted that the single product o f components o f an m-sequence is a highly 
nonrandom sequence. One o f the well-known method o f generating cryptographically 
strong PR sequences is non-linear filtering of the states o f an LFSR. The non-linear filter 
used, is exponentiation over finite fields. The aim of applying this non-linear filter is to 
produce sequences (parallel sequences) with high linear complexity and good statistical 
distribution. M ost o f the definitions and results in this chapter are originally given in 
[Safavi-Naini, 1990].
6.1 Q-ary Sequences
A s has been discussed, the sequence o f states o f an LFSR with a primitive characteristic 
polynomial is periodic with period p  = 2q - 1 ,  where q is the length o f the LFSR. Let
82
CHAPTER 6
S-&i,&2y—ySp be a sequence where #f, 1 < i < p , denotes the state i of the LFSR. We 
have used $ to denote an element of GF(2q). The sequence S is called a q-ary sequence. 
As an example, let the length of an LFSR be q = 4 and let f{x ) = l + x + x* be its 
characteristic polynomial. Since f ( x ) is primitive, then the LFSR starting from a non-zero 
initial state will produce a sequence of period p — 24 —1 = 15, and consequently the 
number of distinct states, or equivalently the length of the q-ary (4-ary) sequence associated 
with the LFSR is 15. Fig. 6.1.1 shows the q-ary sequence S of the states of the LFSR, 
where sl = (1,0,0,0) is the initial state.
i States of LFSR s
n
1 l 0 0 0 <- «1
2 0 0 0 1 *2
3 0 0 1 0 *3
4 0 1 0 0
5 1 0 0 1 %
6 0 0 1 1 ¿6
7 0 1 1 0 ¿7
8 1 1 0 1 *8
9 1 0 1 0 ¿9
10 0 1 0 1 ^10
11 1 0 1 1 *11
12 0 1 1 1 S12
13 1 1 1 1 $13
14 1 1 1 0 «14
15 1 1 0 0 «15
F i g . 6 . 1 . 1  States of an LFSR as a q-ary sequence.
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Using polynomial representation of the elements of GF(24), each state of the LFSR can be 
represented as a polynomial c0 + cxa  + c2a 2 + c3a \  where ci e GF(2), 0 < i < 3, and a  is 
a root of f (x) .  For instance #12 = a  + a 2 + a 3 and #14 = 1 + a  + a 2. These polynomials 
can be written as powers of a  which is the generator of the field: 
a 4 = 1 + a  ,
a 5 = a x  a 4 = a(l +a)  = a  + a 2 ,
a 6 = a x  a 5 = a (a  + a 2) = a 2 + a 3 ,
a 1 = a  x a 6 = a (a 2 + a 3) = a 3 + a 4 = 1 + a  + a 3 , ...
Thus, the q-ary sequence S can be represented in the following forms (Fig. 6.1.2): 
i States of LFSR S S S
3
1 <- 1 0 0 0 1 1
2 0 0 0 1 *2 a 3 a 3
3 0 0 1 0 «3 a 2 a 2
4 0 1 0 0 *4 a a
5 1 0 0 1 % 1 + a 3 a 14
6 0 0 1 1 «6 a 2 + a 3 a 6
7 0 1 1 0 *7 a  + a 2 a 5
8 1 1 0 1 *8 1 + a  + a 3 a 7
9 1 0 1 0 *9 1 + a 2 a 8
10 0 1 0 1 *10 a  + a 3 a 9
11 1 0 1 1 *11 1 + a 2 + a 3 a 13
12 0 1 1 1 *12 a  + a 2 + a 3 a 11
13 1 1 1 1 *13 1 + a + a 2 + a 3 a 12
14 1 1 1 0 *14 1 + a  + a 2 a 10
15 i
Fig.
1 0  0 sl5 1 + a  
6.1.2 Polynomial representation of a q-ary sequence.
a 4
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Let S = ^ ,# 2,... with eGF(2q) be a q-ary sequence. Every elem ent o f S can be 
represented by a binary q-tuple si =  sn siq , si} e  GF(2).
The binary sequence cj , 1 < i < q, obtained by taking the ith — component o f consecutive 
elements o f the q-ary sequence S is called the ith — component sequence,
¿i — ---
There are q component sequences, or equivalently, a q-ary sequence produced q parallel 
sequences.
6.2 Exponentiation of the States of an LFSR
A s has been seen, the maximum number o f the distinct states o f an LFSR of length q is 
p  = 2q - l ,  and they can be represented by 1, a ,  a 2,..., a p~l (Fig. 6 .1 .2 ). Let 
5  =  «p...,$ be a q-ary sequence, where = a"'. The exponentiation o f the q-ary
sequence S is defined as follows.
An exponent sequence S(k\  0 < k < p , is a q-ary sequence obtained by raising the elements 
o f the q-ary sequence, 5 , to power k. Exponentiation is in the field GF(2q) characterised 
by the polynomial / ( * ) .
For instance, let 5  = l , a \ a 2, . . . , a 4 be the q-ary sequence o f Fig. 6.1.2. Table 6.2.1 
demonstrates S(l), 1 < i < p.
Si S2 *3 s4 S5 «6 s7 S8 s9 »10 SH S12 S13 S14 »15
5 (1) 1 a 3 a 2 a a 14 a 6 a 5 a 7 a 8 a 9 a 13 a 11 a 12 a 10 a 4
5 <2) 1 a 6 a 4 a 2 a 13 a 12 a 10 a 14 a a 3 a" a 7 a 9 a 5 a 8
5 (3) 1 a 9 a 6 a 3 a 12 a 3 1 a 6 a 9 a 12 a 9 a 3 a 6 1 a 12
S<4) 1 a 12 a 8 a 4 a" a 9 a 5 a 13 a 2 a 6 a 7 a 14 a 3 a 10 a
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s<5) 1 1 a 10 a 5 a 10 1 a10 a5 a10 1 a 5 a10 1 a5 a5
s<6) 1 a 3 a n a6 a 9 a 6 1 a12 a3 a 9 a 3 a6 a12 1 a9
Sm 1 a6 a14 a7 a 8 a 12 a 5 a4 a11 a3 a a2 a 9 a10 a 13
S* 1 a9 a a8 a7 a 3 a 10 a11 a4 a12 a14 a13 a 6 a 5 a 2
S<9) 1 a12 a3 a9 a6 a9 1 a3 a 12 a6 a12 à 9 a3 1 a 6
S(I0) 1 1 a 5 a10 a5 1 a5 a10 a 5 1 a10 a 5 1 a10 a 10
5<u) 1 a3 a 1 a11 a4 a6 a10 a 2 a 13 a9 a8 a a 12 a5 a 14
5(12) 1 a6 a 9 a12 a3 a12 1 a 9 a6 a3 a 6 a12 a9 1 a 3
5(13) 1 a 9 a11 a13 a2 a3 a5 a a14 a12 a 4 a8 a6 a 10 a 1
5<14> 1 a12 a 13 a14 a a 9 a 10 a 8 a 7 a 6 a2 a4 a3 a 5 a11
5(1S) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
T ab le 6 . 2 . 1  Exponentiation o f a q-aiy sequence.
An exponent sequence 5 (,) is a periodic sequence with a period at most p  = 2q — 1 and 
hence it satisfies a recurrence relation o f degree at most p . A  q-ary sequence S satisfies a 
q-ary linear recurrence o f degree, u , if  every element o f the sequence can be written as a 
linear combination over GF(2q) o f u elements preceding it,
u
si > ci e  GF(2q) , j >  u. (1)
¿=1
The smallest u in which satisfies the equation (1) is called the q-ary linear complexity o f  
S. A  q-ary sequence S satisfies a binary linear recurrence o f degree, L, if  there exists a 
linear recurrence with binary coefficients satisfied by S,
Sj =  ¿ c, . c,eGF(2)  , j >  L . (2)
i=l
The smallest L which satisfies the equation (2) is called the binary linear complexity o f S. 
For instance, the q-ary sequence S in Fig. 6.1.1 satisfies a binary linear recurrence o f  
degree 4,
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Corollary: Let a q-ary sequence, S , satisfies a binary recurrence, L. The linear
complexity o f any component sequence of 5  is upper bounded by L. This is true because 
all component sequences satisfy the same recursion.
6.3 Linear Recurrence of Exponent Sequences
Let S = be a q-ary sequence associated with an LFSR of length, q, and a primitive
characteristic polynomial / ( * ) .  Every component sequence c], l < i < q ,  has linear 
complexity q, with characteristic polynomial / ( x). Thus S has binary linear complexity 
q ; the characteristic polynomial is f(x ) .
An exponent, k , is a basic exponent if  k = 2'. An exponent sequence with such exponent 
is called a basic exponent sequence. It has been proved that the basic exponent sequences 
o f S satisfy the same binary recurrence as 5 , that is because,
q (  q Y ’ q V
if  sk k > i ,  then } ^ > [Safavi-Naini, 1990].
/=l V i=i y i=i
For every other exponents, k can be written in terms of powers o f 2:
k = kq + ^  x  2 +  ^  x  22 + ...+  kq_i x  29 \
thus,
^ (* ) _  gko  +*, x2+k2 x22 X29-1
=  5*« xS*'"  x  S*!X22x...xSkr,xir' .
Since 5 (0) =  1, the elements o f an exponent sequence can be obtained as a product (over 
GF(2q))  o f  the corresponding elements o f at most q basic exponent sequences. The 
number o f  basic exponent sequences used in multiplication is equal to the number o f ones 
in the binary representation o f k, which is called the weight o f k .
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Integers modulo 2q - 1  are divided into cyclotomic cosets, Ci [Golomb, 1967]:
C; = {/, 2/, / x 2 2,..., / x 2 i_1} mod(2* - 1 ) .
W e note that the weight o f the elements o f a cyclotomic coset is the same. The following 
theorem is originally proved in [Safavi-Naini, 1990] (we give an alternative proof).
Theorem 6 .3 .1
A ll exponent sequences *S(V) where v e Ci satisfy the same minimum binary recurrence 
relation.
Proof. Let i e  Cf, j  e  C(, i ^ j ,  and let S(l) satisfies a minimum binary recurrence
o f degree q . Since j  = ix  2h m od(p), thus SU) = S(ix2A} = [S(i) f * , and it satisfies the
same binary recurrence relation.
Corollary: It is sufficient to find the linear recurrence o f one exponent sequence S(,) for
each cyclotomic coset Cr
It has been shown that linear equivalence o f S(I\  0 < i < 2q - 1, is upper bounded by
,where w is the weight o f i and S = #p s2,... is a q-ary sequence associated with a
;=1 yjJ
maximum-length LFSR o f length q [Safavi-Naini, 1990].
Corollary: The linear complexity o f all component sequences o f an exponent sequence
S(t), 0  < i < 2q - 1 is upper bounded by:
Note that from a cryptographic point o f view it would be much more interesting to have the 
lower instead o f the upper bounds on the linear complexity o f exponential sequences.
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It has been shown that the qth -  order product of components of a maximum-length LFSR 
o f length q produce a sequence with maximum linear complexity,
= 2 * - l ,
(see theorem 5.2.2). W e w ill show that for component sequences o f an exponent 
sequence, S{1\  this upper bound should be reduced by one.
Theorem 6 .3 .2
Let £  =  ^ ,$ 2, . . . , « ^  be a q-ary sequence associated with a LFSR o f length q and a 
primitive characteristic polynomial. The linear complexity o f a component sequence of an 
exponent sequence S(i\  0 < / < 2q - 1  is upper bounded by 2q -  2 .
Proof. Achieving the maximum linear complexity requires the maximum weight of
exponent, which is q , and is valid when exponent is equal to 2q - 1 .  But in GF(29) 
raising any element to power i = 2q - 1  w ill give 1 (see for example the last row of Table 
6.2.1, which corresponds to £ (24_1)). Therefore, the maximum linear com plexity o f a 
component sequence can be related to the situation when the weight o f i w ill be equal to
q - 1.
= (2, - l ) - l  =  2 , - 2 .
6.4 Generation of Exponent sequences
Generation o f exponent sequences can be done in two steps: 
- generating basic exponent sequences,
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- multiplying a subset o f basic exponent sequences that corresponds to the binary 
representation o f the exponent.
The first step can be performed as part o f pre-calculation. For instance, let 
f ( x ) =  1 +  x  +  x4 be the characteristic polynomial o f LFSR. The state /, 1 < i < 15, o f the 
LFSR can be represented as follows:
si = ci0 + cila + c i2a 2 +ci3a \
Since the length o f the LFSR is q = 4 , the maximum period is 2q - 1  = 15 and the basic 
exponent sequences are s f  \  s ? \  s{4) and #,(8). The calculation of sj2) in GF(24) is
s<2>=  (c1-o + c ila  + cl2a 2 + c i3a 3)2,
=  ( c ,o)2 + ( c , i « ) 2 + (ci2a 2)2 +(ca,a 3)2,
*!2) = Ci0 + cncc + c i2a “ + ci3a 6,
4 2>= Ci0 + cncx + c i2(1 + a )+ c i3(a 2 +  « 3),
=  ( c ,0 +  c ,2 )+ c na  +  (c„ +  cl3 )a 2 +  ci3a 3
The same calculations can be performed for evaluating s-4) and s[8). The result w ill be:
*i4) =  (c,o +  c,i +  Ca + cn) +  (ca + cl3) a  + (ca + ci3)a 2 + cna \
«¡8) = ( c,o + c ii) +  (c,2 + c i3) a + c ila 2 + c i3a \
The second step that correspond to a specific exponent can require at m ost q 
multiplications over GF(2q) for generation of q pseudo-random bits. For instance, 
evaluation o f S(3) = S x  S(2) requires two multiplications over GF(2q), while evaluation o f  
Sa) = S x  Sm x S(4) requires three multiplication over GF(29).
An important property o f this generator is the ease and economy o f its implementation. 
Suppose the non-linear generator o f S(3) o f Table 6.2.1 is required. Since Si3) = S x  Si2), 
thus,
90
CHAPTER 6
S(3) -  (CiO + c i0c i2 + c nCi3 + c ac i2 ) + (c i0c i2 + c i0c n + c i2c i3 + c i3)x +
( C i0 c i l  +  c i0 c i3  +  Cnc i2 +  c i2c i0 +  c i2 +  c i2c i3 +  c nc i3) x 2 +  (cn +  c i2 +  c i3 +  c nc i3 +  c i2c i3) x :
The non-linear (exponentiation) generator associated with S(3) is shown in Fig. 6.4.1.
the first component
the second component
the third component
the fourth component
Fig. 6.4.1 Parallel generation o f component sequences.
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6.5 Cryptographic Properties of Exponent Sequences
Let S = sp ^ , . . . , # ^  be a q-ary sequence associated with an LFSR o f length q and a 
primitive characteristic polynomial. If the jth  and kth terms ( j  *  k) o f  the exponent
sequence, S(i), 0  < i < 2q - 1, are the same (for / = 0 or i = 2q - 1  all elements o f S(i) are 
the same) then:
There are two possible cases:
- The greatest common devisor (GCD) of i and 2q - 1  is 1. In this case /, n} and nk
are less than 2q — 1, and the equation (1) cannot be satisfied, thus all elem ents o f the 
exponent sequence are distinct
- GCD(U 2 ? - 1 )  = hy i = h x u , 2q - 1  = h x v  and GCD(u, v) =  1. Since j * k ,  
1 < ( r i j n k) < 2q -  2 the equation (1) for (n;. -  nk) e  {v, 2v, 3v,..., (h -  l)v} w ill be
satisfied. Therefore, there are (2q - 1) /  h distinct powers o f a  in S(l) each with the same 
multiplicity h.
For instance Table 6.2.1 demonstrates that S(2) consists o f 15 distinct elem ents
15(GCD(2, 2 4 - 1 )  = l ) ,  S{3) consists o f —  = 5 distinct elements each with multiplicity 3
(GCD(5, 15) = 5 ). The following theorem is originally proved in [Safavi-Naini, 1990] 
(we give an alternative proof).
The exponent sequences with exponents in the same cyclotomie coset are consisted o f the 
same elements (same power o f a ), but in different order.
( a ”0 (f) = ,
i(nj - n k) = 0 m od(2? - 1 ) .
(1)
Theorem 6 .5 .1
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Proof. Let /a n d ;  be elem ents o f  the sam e cyclotom ie coset, and let
GCD(U 2q - l )  = h, l < h < i .  Since j  = i x 2 k m o d (2 * - l) ,  and G C D (2\ 2? - l )  = l  
thus GCD (j, 29 — 1) = h and consequently »S(,) and 5 (;) will consist o f the same elements.
This result can be used to find the frequency o f ones and zeros in the component
sequences. For instance all component sequences o f an exponent sequence, S^\ where 
GCD{U 2* - 1 )  = 1, (i.e. Sa\ S (2\ S (4\ S a\ S (Z\ S (n\ S (13) and S(14) o f Table 6.2.1) consist
o f 2q 1 ones and 2q~l - 1  zeros, because S(t) contains the same states as S but in different 
order. A s another example consider the case that GCD(i, 2 * - l ) * l .  For instance S(5) o f
Table 6.2.1 consists o f  three distinct elements each with m ultiplicity 5. They are 
1, a 5 and a 10, that correspond to states (1,0,0,0), (0,1,1,0) and (1,1,1,0) respectively.
1 x s______
1 0 1
0 1 1
0 1 1
0 0 0
The first row, which corresponds to the first component sequence, consists o f 2 ones and 
one zero. Since the multiplicity o f each element is 5, thus the first component sequence 
w ill consist o f 10 ones and 5 zeros. The second and the third component sequences will 
have also the same number o f ones and zeros. But the fourth component consists o f 15 
zeros. The linear com plexity of component sequences of S{5\  is upper bounded by
Jy A = 4 +  6 = 10, but the fourth component has the linear complexity 0.
This result can be used to find the cross-correlation of component sequences. For instance,
N 0(411,2,3 : 1,0,1) = 0 , = _ ; indicates that component sequences o f above
2 8
exponent sequence S(5) are not statistically independent o f order 4.
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Therefore, obtaining component sequences with good statistical properties and long period 
(equal to 2q — 1) implies that GCD(i, 29 — 1) = 1. If 2q - 1  is a prime number, all the
exponent sequences and their component sequences will have maximum period.
6.6 Experimental Results
In this section w e give experimental results for sample sequences. W e consider an LFSR  
o f length 11 with the primitive characteristic polynomial given by f ( x ) =  1 +  x2 + x11.
Thus, w e generate a q-ary (11-ary) sequence o f period 211 - 1  = 2047. Since 2047 is a 
prime number, all exponent sequences will have the maximum period (equal to 2047).
Study o f exponent sequences indicated that higher linear complexity can only be obtained in 
higher exponent sequences (more precisely in exponents with higher weights). A s has 
been discussed, the maximum linear complexity o f the component sequences are equal to 
211 -  2 =  2046 , which corresponds to exponents o f 11 - 1  =  10. The exponent selected in 
this section is 1023, which has the weight 10 (its binary representation is 1111111111).
Theoretically it is expected that all 11 components satisfactorily pass the frequency test In 
fact each component sequence will consist of 1024 ones and 1023 zeros. Moreover, the set 
o f all 11 components are statistically independent of order 11 (see theorem 3.7.1). In order 
to apply statistical tests w e observe that the passing values of each component sequences is 
given by Table 5.5.1 (see 5.5).
Table 6.6.1 gives the result o f applying statistical tests on the 11 components o f S(1023) 
(where S is the q-ary sequence associated with the LFSR with the primitive characteristic 
polynom ial / ( * )  = l + x2 +  x11). The seq uence c;(1023), 1 < / < 11, denotes the
ith -  component o f the exponent sequence, S(1023).
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No. Sequence Frequency Serial Run Poker Autocorre-
test test test test lation test
1 —(1023)ci 0.000488 0.013190 17.9351 7.49835 96.0%
2 ”•(1023)c2 0.000488 0.259404 27.6421 3.45667 95.9%
3 »-(1023)°3 0.000488 0.600879 5.61300 2.34936 94.9%
4 ”•(1023)C4 0.000488 0.990230 22.7986 0.58092 95.7%
5 ”•(1023)°5 0.000488 0.005374 8.77044 0.89683 95.4%
6 ”•(1023)C6 0.000488 0.405471 9.78764 3.74978 95.6%
7 ”•(1023)C7 0.000488 0.060088 11.5828 4.39137 95.5%
8 "•(1023)c 8 0.000488 0.411822 12.1493 1.18668 95.4%
9 o t
o CO 0.000488 4.984367 21.8277 5.41075 95.5%
10 ”•(1023)c10 0.000488 0.411822 16.1619 0.51252 95.8%
11 ”•(1023)C11 0.000488 0.532975 8.22718 0.54183 95.6%
Table 6.6.1
Results o f applying statistical tests over the component sequences.
It can be seen that nearly all component sequences satisfactorily pass all statistical tests. 
Moreover, Nh(in \iv i2,—yhQ • a p a 2, . . . ,a 10) = 1 for all possible cases. On the other hand, 
nh(iu ) either is 210 or 210 - 1 .  Therefore,
,¿1 0 . ava2, > « 1 0  )  — 210 ’
which indicates that the set o f all 11 components o f the exponent sequence are statistically 
independent.
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In order to investigate the randomness, or equivalently the unpredictability o f  the 
com ponent sequences, they are subjected to the Ziv-Lempel com plexity and the linear 
com plexity measures. W e have noted that all sequences with sufficiently large length are 
com plex (from the point o f view o f Ziv-Lempel complexity measure). This is verified by 
the result o f this exponent as reported in Table 6.6.2. However, with respect to the linear 
complexity measure, three parameters (Value, Jumps and CPU time) for each sequence are 
reported. The results indicate that all component sequences are complex (from the point o f  
view  o f both Ziv-Lempel and Linear complexity measures). Linear complexity profiles are 
presented to confirm the unpredictability o f component sequences.
No Sequence
Ziv-Lempel
Complexity
Linear Complexity
Value Value Jumps CPU time/sec.
1
»4023
C1 197 2046 1004 27826
2
»4023
c2 196 2046 1049 27991
3
»4023
C3 197 2046 1036 28058
4
»4023
c4 198 2046 1059 28187
5
»4023
c5 195 2035 1023 31674
6
•••1023
C« 196 2035 980 32983
7
»4023
c7 196 2046 1013 31934
8
•••1023
C8 194 2046 1022 33392
9
"•1023c9 200 2046 1030 31827
10
»4023
c10 197 2046 1014 31624
11
»4023
C11 197 2046 1004 31431
Table 6 .6 .2
Results of applying complexity measures over the component sequences.
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6.7 Summary
In this chapter a method o f generating PR sequences with high linear complexity and good 
statistical distribution has been considered. The non-linear filter used, is exponentiation 
over fin ite fields. Q-ary sequences obtained from the states o f an LFSR has been 
introduced. Linear recurrence o f q-ary sequences and their associated component 
sequences have been considered. An easy and economical method o f generating exponent 
sequences has been introduced. Upper bound on the linear com plexity and statistical 
properties o f individual component sequences have been used to asses the security o f the 
parallel generator of cryptographically strong pseudo-random sequences.
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Conclusion and Comments
W e have considered generation o f cryptographically strong PR sequences by:
- applying non-linear transformation on the states o f LFSRs,
- applying transformation (linear or non-linear) on the decimal expansion o f irrational 
numbers.
Non-linear transformations which only utilise high-order products are cryptographically 
unsuitable. Exponential filtering of the state sequence (q-ary sequence) o f LFSR provides 
a method for generating parallel PR sequences. For properly chosen exponents, the 
component sequences have good statistical properties (distribution and interdependence) 
and high linear equivalence. The higher linear complexity is related to the higher weight o f  
the exponent. The exponents that belong to the same cyclotomie cosets have the same 
com plexity. If 2q - 1  is a prime number then all the exponent sequences and their
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associated component sequences have the highest period ( 2 ? - 1 )  and good statistical 
properties.
Transformations on the decimal expansion of irrational numbers provide an alternative 
method for generating PR sequences. The experimental results justify the potential o f  
irrational numbers for this purpose. The properties o f the resulting sequences are not well 
understood. This study suggests further investigation o f irrational numbers as key 
generators.
103
REFERENCES
REFERENCES
[Beker and Piper, 1982] H. Beker and F. piper, Cipher System s The Protection o f  
Communications, UK, 1982.
[Beth and Piper, 1985] T. Beth and F. Piper, "The stop-and-go generator", Advances in 
Cryptology (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 209) Proc. Eurocrypt v84, Eds. T.Beth, N. Cot 
and I. Ingemarsson, pp. 88-92, Springer Verlag, 1985.
[Blahut, 1983] R. E. Blahut, Theory and Practice o f Error Control Codes, Addison-
W esley, 1983.
[Bruer, 1984] J. O. Bruer, "On pseudo random sequences as crypto generators", Proc.
Int. Zurich Seminar on Digital Communication, Switzerland, 1984.
[Chaitin, 1966] G. J. Chaitin, "On the Length o f Program for Computing Finite Binary 
Sequences", Journal o f the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 
547-569, Oct. 1966.
[Erdmann, 1992] E. D. Erdmann, “Empirical Tests o f Binary Keystreams”, Master o f  
Philosophy Thesis, University o f London, London, 1992.
[Freeman, 1963] H. Freeman, Introduction to Statistical Inference, Addison-W esley, 
U SA , 1963.
104
REFERENCES
[G effe, 1973] P.R. Geffe, "How to protect data with ciphers that are realy hard to
break," Electronics, Jan., 1973.
[Gollman and Chambers, 1989] D. Gollman and W.G. Chambers, "Clock-Controlled 
Shift Registers: A  review", IEEE J. Selected Areas Commun., vol. 7, pp. 525-533, 1989. 
[Golomb, 1967] S. W. Golomb, Shift Register Sequences, Holden-Day, San Fransisco, 
1967.
[Gunther, 1988] C. G. Gunther, "Alternating step generators controlled by de Bruijn 
sequences", Advances in Cryptology (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 304) Proc. Eurocrypt 
'87 , eds. D. Chaum and W. L. Price, pp. 5-14, Springer Verlag, 1988.
[Janssen, 1989] C. J. A. Janssen, "Investigations on Non-linear Stream Cipher Systems: 
Construction and Evaluation Methods", PhD Thesis, Technical University o f Delf, Delf, April 
1989.
[Kahn, 1967] D. Kahn, The Codebreakers the story of secret writing, Macmillan, New
York, 1967.
[Key, 1976] E. Key, "an analysis of the structure and complexity o f nonlinear binary
sequence generators," IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. IT-22, No. 6, pp. 732­
736, Novem ber 1976.
[Knuth, 1969] Donald E. Knuth, The Art o f Computer Programming, vol. 2, Addison-
W esley, U SA , 1969.
105
REFERENCES
[Lidl and Niederreiter, 1986] R. Lidl and H. Niederreiter, Introduction to Finite Fields
and Their Applications, Cambridge University Press, 1986.
[M assey, 1969] J. L. M assy, “Shift-Register Synthesis and BCD D ecoding”, IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. IT-15, no. 1, pp. 122-127, Jan. 1969.
[Maurer, 1990] U. Maurer, "Provable Security in Cryptography", PhD Thesis, Swiss 
Federal Institute o f Technology, Zurich, 1990.
[Meier and Staffelbach, 1990] W. Meier and O. Staffelbach, "Correlation properties of
com biners with memory in stream ciphers", Advances in Cryptology (Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science 473), Pro. Eurocrypt v90, Ed. I. Damgard, pp. 204-213, Springer-Verlag, 
1990.
[Mund, 1991] S. Mund, "Ziv-Lempel Complexity for Periodic Sequences and its
Cryptographic Application" Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings o f Eurocrypt '91, Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 547, pp. 114-126.
[Niven, 1961] I. Niven, Numbers: Rational and Irrational, Mathematical Association of
America, Washington, 1961.
[Rueppel, 1984] R. A. Rueppel, "New Approaches to Stream Ciphers", PhD Thesis, 
Swiss Federal Institute o f Technology, Zurich, 1984.
[Rueppel, 1984] R. A. Rueppel, "Correlation immunity and the summation combiner", 
Advances in Cryptology (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 218), Proc. Crypto '85 , Ed. H. 
C. W illiam s, pp. 260-272, Springer-Verlage, 1986.
106
REFERENCES
[Rueppel, 1992] R. A. Rueppel, "Stream Ciphers", Contemporary Cryptology The 
Science o f Information Integrity, IEEE press, Ed. G. J. Simmons, USA, 1992.
[Safavi-Naini, 1990] R. Safavi-N aini, "Parallel Generation o f  Pseudo-Random
Sequences", Auscrypt 90, Advances in Cryptology, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 
453, pp. 176-193.
[Seberry and Pieprzyk, 1989] J. Seberry and J. P ieprzyk, Cryptography: an 
Introduction to Computer Security, Prentice Hall, 1989.
[Shannon, 1949] C. E. Shannon, "Communication Theory o f Secrecy Systems", Bell 
System Technical Journal, vol. 28, pp. 656-715, 1949.
[Siegenthaler, 1984] T. Siegenthaler, "Correlation immunity o f Nonlinear Com bining  
Functions for Cryptographic Applications", IEEE Trans, on Info. Theory, IT-30, pp 776-780, 
1984.
[Tilborg, 1988] Henk C. A. Van Tilborg, An Introduction to Cryptology, Kluwer 
Academic, U SA , 1988.
[Ziv and Lempel, 1976] J. Ziv and A. Lempel, “On the Complexity o f Finite Sequences”, 
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. IT-22, no. 1, pp. 75-81, January 1976.
107
APPENDIX
Appendix
In this section the list o f the programs developed for this study is presented. In order to generate 
exponent sequences the following procedures are used:
- LFSR := proc(fx, init, long); generates a sequence (using LFSR) with characteristic 
polynomial given by fx, initial valuegiven by init, and length equal to long.
- Basic_Exponents := proc(fx); produces the basic exponents to be used in exponentiation 
o f the sequence.
- Exponentiation := proc(fx, seq, pow, per); raises the sequence, seq , o f period, per , 
generated with characteristic polynomial,/»:, to power pow.
In order to apply statistical tests, which are presented in Chapter 3, the following procedures are 
used:
- Frequency_Test := proc(seq, per); applies frequency test to the sequence seq o f period 
per.
- Serial_Test := proc(seq, per); applies serial test to the sequence seq o f period per.
- Poker_Test := proc(seq, per); applyies poker test to the sequence seq of period per.
- Run_Test := proc(seq, per); applies run-test to the sequence seq of period per.
- Autocorrelation_Test := proc(seq, per); applies autocorrelation test to the sequence seq of 
period per.
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For examining the unpredictability of a sequence the following two procedures are used:
- Berlekamp_Massey := proc(seq, per,); calculates the linear complexity of a sequence seq 
of period per.
- Ziv_Lempel := proc(seq, per); evaluates the Ziv-Lempel complexity of a sequence seq of 
period per.
Finally, to examine the inter-dependency of component sequences the following procedure is 
used.
- Cross_Correlation := proc(co, q, per); calculates the cross correlation of q component 
sequences given by co and of period per.
In the following pages we give a listing of these procedures and all the required functions and 
present an example.
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Max__Length := 490; # Restriction length of a string in Maple v.
LFSR := proc(fx, init, long)
# This procedure generates a sequence (using LFSR) with
# characteristic polynomial (fx) ,
# initial state (init), and length (long).
# If long is greater than the period then long = period,
local i, j, k, 1, m, n, switch; # Temporary variables.
# Verify the input of the procedure.
if (type(fx, polynom(integer, x)) = false) or 
(type(init, string) = false) or
(type(long, integer) = false)
then ERROR('Wrong type of input'); fi;
m ;= truncilong / Max_Length);
sequence := array(0..m); # sequence is an array of strings
for i from 0 to m do
sequence[i] := # to clean up the area
od;
dimension := degree(fx); 
if dimension = 0
then if (fx <> 1)
then ERROR('Wrong polynomial in GF(2Aq)'); 
else sequence[0] := '1'; RETURN0; fi; 
fi;
if dimension <> length(init)
then E R R O R('Wrong length for the initial string');fi;
j := 0;
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for i from 1 to dimension do
if (substring(init, i..i) <> '0') and 
(substring(init, i..i) <> '1')
then ERROR('Wrong character in initial state'); 
fi;
# calculate coefficients ofcharacteristic polynomial, 
k := coeff(fx, x, i-1); 
if k = 0
then next; fi;
if k = 1
then j ;= j + 1;
e[j] := dimension - (i-1); 
else ERROR('Wrong polynomial in GF(2*q)'); fi; 
od;
# End of verifying the input.
sequence[0] := init; # Initial state of the LFSR
for period from dimension+1 while (period <= long) do 
if period > (2~dimension - 1)
then period := (2^dimension - 1); break; fi; 
1 :=  0;
for i from 1 to j do
1 := (1 + Element(sequence, period-e[i])) mod 2;
od;
Row_Col(period);
sequence[Row] := cat(sequence[Row], 1) ; 
switch := 1;
1 := period - dimension + 1;
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n := Get_String(sequence, period, 1, dimension); 
if substring(sequence[0], 1..dimension) <> n 
then switch := 0; fi; 
if switch = 1
then period := 1 - 1; break; fi;
od;
if period > (2Adimension - 1)
then period := (2Adimension - 1); fi;
end;
Get_String := proc(seq, per, spos, len)
# This procedure returns a substring of length (len)
# begining at position (spos) within sequence (seq).
local i, j, k, s; # Temporary variables.
Row_Col(spos) ;
j := spos + len -1 - per; 
if j > 0
then k := len - j; 
else k := len; fi;
i := Col + k - 1; 
if i > Max_Length
then s := substring(seq[Row] , Col..Max_Length); 
i := i - Max_Length;
s := cat(s, substring(seq[Row+1], l..i) );
else s ;= substring(seq[Row], Col..i); fi;
if j > 0
then s := cat(s, substring(seq[0] , l..j) ); fi;
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RETURN(s);
end;
Row_Col := proc(pos) # Compute the index of an element 
Row ;= trunc(pos / Max_Length);
Col := pos mod Max_Length; 
if Col = 0
then Row := Row - 1;
Col := Max_Length; fi;
end;
Basic_Exponents := proc(fx)
# Build elements in which is needed for exponentiation 
local i, j, k, 1, m; # Temporary variables,
if type( fx, polynom(integer, x) ) = false
then ERROR('wrong polynomial of x in GF(2*q)'); fi; 
dimension := degree(fx); 
for i from 0 to dimension do 
alpha(i] := x^i;
if (coeffffx, x, i) <> 0) and (coeffifx, x, i) <> 1) 
then ERROR ('wrong polynomial of x in GF(2/Nq)'); 
fi;
od;
alpha[dimension] := fx - x^dimension; 
k := trunc( evalf( log[2](dimension) ) ) + 1; 
for i from (dimension+1) to (2*dimension-l) do 
alpha[i] := expand(alpha[i-1] * x);
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if degree(alpha[i]) = dimension
then alpha(i] := (alpha[i] + fx) mod 2; fi; 
od;
# Build the basic exponents
si.l := ci.O;
for i to dimension-1 do
si.l := expand(si.l + ci.i * alpha[i]) mod 2;
od;
for i from 2 to dimension do
si.i := coeff(si.(i-1), x, 0); 
for j to dimension-1 do
si.i := si.i + coeff(si.(i-1),x,j) * alpha[2*j]; 
si.i := expand(si.i) mod 2;
od;
od;
end;
Element := proc(seq, pos) # returns value of pos-th element
Row_Col(pos);
if substring(seq[Row], Col..Col) = 'O' 
then RETURN(0); 
else RETURN(1); fi;
end;
Exponentiation := proc(fx, seq, pow, per)
# Fast exponentiation to raise a state of an LFSR
# to power (pow), where fx denotes the characteristic
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# polynomial of sequence (seq) with period (per).
local i, j, k, 1, n, c, cx; # Temporary variables.
dimension := degree(fx);
compi := array(0..dimension-1);
n := trunc(per / Max_Length);
for i to dimension do
component.i := array(0..n);
for j from 0 to n do # Clean up the area.
component.i[j] := '' ; 
od;
od;
exponent := pow mod (2Adimension -1) ; 
exps := 1;
for i to dimension do
j := dimension - i; 
if exponent >= (2Aj)
then exponent := exponent - (2Aj);
exps := expand(exps * si.(j +1)) mod 2; 
for k from dimension to (2*dimension -1) do 
n := coeff(exps, x, k) ; 
if n <> 0
then exps := exps + n*xAk;
exps := exps + n*alpha[k]; 
exps := expand(exps) mod 2; 
fi; 
od; 
f i;
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Od;
for i from 0 to dimension-1 do 
co.i := coeff(exps, x, i); 
od;
for i to per do 
set := {};
for j from 0 to dimension-1 do 
k := (i + j) mod per; 
if k = 0
then k := per; fi;
set := set union {ci.j = Element(seq, k)};
od;
Row_Col(i);
for j to dimension do
k ;= subs(set, co.(j-l)) mod 2;
component.j[Row] := cat(component.j[Row], k);
od;
od;
end;
Frequency_Test := proc(seq, per)
local nO, nl, i; # Temporary variables.
if per <10 # Minimum required length for Frequency-test
then Frequency := -1; RETURN() ; fi; 
nl := 0;
for i to per do # To count the number of Is
nl ;= nl + Element(seq, i) ;
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Od;
nO := per - nl; # Number of Os
n2 := per/2; # Expected number of os/Is
DOF := 1; # Degree-of-freedom for Frequency_Test
Frequency := evalf(( ((nO - n2)*2) + ((nl - n2)A2) ) / n2);
end;
Serial_Test := proc(seq, per)
local n, nO, nl, i, j, k, s; # Temporary variables, 
n := array(0..3);
n[0] := 0; # for storing the number of / o o cases
n[l] := 0; # for storing the number of 'or cases
n [2 ] := 0; # for storing the number of '10' cases
n [3 ] ;= 0; # for storing the number of 'ii' cases
nO := 0; # for storing the number of zeros within sequence
nl ;= 0; # for storing the number of ones within sequence
if per <20 # Minimum length required for Serial test
then Serial ;= -1; RETURNO; fi;
for i from 1 to per-1 do
s := Get_String(seq, per, i, 2);# get a 2-bits string
j := Value_Of(s); # The value of 2bits string
n[j] := n[j] + 1; # To count the observations
if j<2 then nO := nO + 1;
else nl := nl + 1; fi;
od;
if (j=0) or (j=2) then nO := nO + 1;
else nl := nl + 1; fi;
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DOF := 2; # Degree-of-freedom for Serial_Test
i := ( 4/(per-l) ) * sum( (n[k])A2 , k=0..3); 
j := ( 2/per ) * (nOA2 + nlA2 );
Serial := evalf(i - j + 1) ;
end;
Value__Of := proc(s) # Convert a binary string into integer,
local i, j, k; # Temporary variables,
i := length( s ) ;  .
k : = 0 ;
for j from 1 to i do
if substring(s, j..j) = '1'
then k := k + 2A(i-j); fi;
od;
RETURN(k);
end;
Poker_Test := prociseq, per)
local i, j, 1, k, n, X,  np, s; # Temporary variables,
if per < 400 # Minimum required length for Poker_Test.
then Poker := -1; RETURNO; fi;
X ;= array(1..5); # To store the number of observations,
for i to 5 do
X[i] := 0;
od;
s := array(0..0); # A temporary string workarea
np := array(1..5); # To stor expexted observations
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# Expoxted number of observations in any of categories.
np[l] := 2/32 * per/5;
np [2 ] := 8/32 * per/5;
np [ 3 ] := 12/32 ★ per/5;
np [ 4 ] := 8/32 * per/5;
np [ 5 ] := 2/32 * per/5;
DOF := 4; # Degree-of-freedom for Poker_Test
for i from 1 to per-4 by 5 do
s[0] := Get_String(seq,per,i,5);# get a 5 bits string, 
k := 0; # Compute the number of differents.
for j from 1 to 5 do
1 := abs(Run_Length_Of(s, 5, j) ) ; 
k :=k + 1; 
j := j + 1 - 1;
od;
X [k] := X [k] + 1;
od;
Poker := evalf(sum(( ( X [ n ] - n p [ n ])*2 / n p [ n ] ) ,  n = 1 . . 5 )  );
end;
Run_Length_Of := prociseq, per, pos)
# Returns the length of a run begining at position (pos).
# The positive(negative) value indicates to blocks(gaps).
local i, j, k, r; # Temporary variables.
i := Element(seq, pos);
if i = 0 then r := -1;
else r := 1; fi;
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k := 0;
for j from pos to per do
if Element(seq, j) = i 
then k := k + r; 
else break; fi;
od;
RETURN(k);
end;
Run_Test := proc(seq, per)
local i, j, k, absj, m, n, X0, XI, Y; # Temporary variables, 
if per <= 128 # Minimum required length for Run_Test
then Run; = -1; RETURNO; fi;
# Catculate the number of category per each type of run. 
k := evalf( log[2](per) ); 
if trunc(k) < k
then k := trunc(k) - 2; 
else k ;= k - 3; fi;
DOF := 2 * (k - 1); # Degree-of-freedom for Run_Test.
X0 := array(l..k); # number of gaps with length 1
Xl := array(l..k); # number of blocks with length 1
Y := array(l..k); # Expected values of XOs/Xls
for i from 1 to k do
X0[i] := 0; # X0[1] denotes 0, x0[2] denotes 00,
Xl[i] := 0; # Xl[l] denotes 1, xl[2] denotes 11,
od;
for i from 1 to per do
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j := Run_Length_Of(seq, per, i); 
abs j := abs(j) ; 
if j>0
then if absj >= k
then XI[k] := XI[k] + 1;
else XI[absj] := XI[absj] + 1; fi; 
elif absj >= k
then XO[k] := XO[k] + 1; 
else XO[absj] := X0[absj] + 1; 
fi;
i := i + absj - 1; 
od;
m := per/(sum(n/(2An) , n=l. .k+3) ) ; # Expected number of runs, 
j : = 0;
for i from 1 to k-1 do
Y [i] := m/(2A(i+l)); # Expected runs of length i.
j := j + Y[i];
od;
Y[k] := m/2 - j; # Expected number of runs of length >= k. 
i := sum(((XO[n]-Y[n])A2 + (Xl[n]-Y[n])A2 )/Y[n], n=l..k); 
Run := evalf(i);
end;
Autocorrelation_Test := proc(seq, per)
local i, j, ij/ std, counter, total; # Temporary variables, 
if per<10 #Minimum required length for Autocorrelation_Test. 
then Autocorrelation := -1; R E T U R N(); fi;
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u := per / 2; # Mean of observations,
std := evalf(sqrt(u/2)); # Standard deviation.
# Lower Sc upper bounds of acceptable autocorrelation value, 
lower := u - 2 * std;
upper ;= u + 2 * std; 
counter := 0; # as a counter
for i to per-1 do 
total := 0; 
for j to per do 
ij := i + j; 
if ij > per
then ij := ij - per; fi;
if Element(seq, j) <> Element(seq, ij) 
then total := total+1; fi;
od;
if (total >= lower) and ( total <= upper) 
then counter : = counter + 1; fi; 
od;
# compute the percentage of acceptable autocorrelations. 
Autocorrelation := evalf( (counter * 100)/ (per -1) );
end;
Berlekamp_Massey ;= proc(seq, per)
# Temporary variables and initializations, 
local j, k, 1, m, n, kjmod, lm, lc, cx, cmx, x;
m := 0; # Last position which linear complexity jumpeded.
lm := 0; # Linear complexity at position m.
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lc := 0; # Linear Complexity at position i.
LC := 0; # The number of Linear Complexity jumps, 
ckx := 1; # Characteristic polynomial at position i. 
cmx := 1/x; # Characteristic polynomial at position m.
curve:= []; # List of poinbts for drawing profile, 
for k from 1 to (2*per - 1) do 
cx := ckx - x^lc; 
n : = 0 ;
while (cx <> 0) do
j := lc - degree(cx); 
if (k-j) > per
then kjmod := (k - j) mod per; 
else kjmod := (k-j); fi;
n := ( n + Element(seq, kjmod) ) mod 2; 
cx := cx - x^(lc - j);
od;
if k > per
then kjmod := k mod per; 
else kjmod := k; fi;
# If cx can not generate next bit then rebuild cx 
if Element(seq, kjmod) <> n
then 1 := max( lc, k-lc );
cx: = (x^(1-lc)*ckx+x^(1-k+l+m-lm)*cmx) mod 2; 
if lc <> degree(cx) 
then m := k-1; 
lm := lc; 
lc := degree(cx);
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cmx := ckx;
LC := LC + 1;
curve := [ op(curve), k, lc] ; 
fi;
ckx := cx;
fi;
ckx := expand(ckx) mod 2; # Characteristic polynomial;
od;
curve := [op(curve), k, lc];
Linear_Complexity := degree(ckx);
end;
Ziv_Lempel ;= proc(seq, per)
# Computes Ziv-Lempel Complexity of sequence of period(per). 
local i, j, ij, ii# il, jl, eof; # Temporary variables, 
if n > 0
# There will be exist at least one word, 
then Ziv_Lempel_Complexity := 1; fi; 
for i from 2 to per do 
ii := 0;
for j from 1 to i-1 do 
eof := 0;
for ij from 0 while( (i+ij) <= per) do 
il := i 4- ij; 
jl := j + ij;
if Element(seq, il) <> Element(seq, jl) 
then break; fi;
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if il = per
then eof := 1; fi;
od;
if ii < ij # A new word has found.
then ii := ij; fi; 
if eof = 1  # End of sequence
then break; fi;
od;
i := i + ii; .
Ziv_Lempel_Complexity := Ziv_Lempel_Complexity + 1;
od;
end;
Cross_Correlation ;= proc(co, q, per)
# This procedure detects statistical independent subset, p,
# of a set ,q, (p<=q), where co.k is a component
# (for k=1,2,...,q)
local i, j, k, 1, m, weight, comp; # Temporary variables 
m := 2^q-l; # Maximum number, representable by q bits,
weight := array(3..m, 0..q);
# The first dimension stores an integer (i.e. weight[3,...]
# The second dimension is used to store the wheight of the
# integer and their positions. For instance, the integer 10
# has weight, 2, (1010), and will be stored as
# weight[10,0]=2, weight[10,1]=1 and weight[10,2]=3.
comp := array(l..q); # To store a state.
nhl := array(l..q); # Number of one's in a component.
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nhO := array (l..q); # Number of zero's in a component,
for i to q do
nhl[i] := 0; 
od;
# Weight of a number indicates the components of set, p. 
for i from 3 to m do # 1 and 2 have weight 1, so ignored, 
weight[i, 0] := 0; # To store weight of i.
k := i;
. 1 := 0;
for j to q while(k>0) do 
if k >= 2A(q-j)
then k : = k - 2/'(q-j);
weight [i, 0] := weight [i, 0] + 1;
1 := 1 + 1 ;
weight[i,l] := j; # Position of Is in i
fi;
APPENDIX
od;
n. i := array(0..2*1-1) ; # Representable numbers
for k from 0 to 2/Nl-l do
n.i[k] := 0; # Clean up the area
od;
od;
# Process for computing cross-correlation 
for i to per do
for j to q do
comp[j] := Element(co.j,i); # The i-th state
nhl[j] := nhl[j] + comp[j]; # To count one's
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od;
for j from 3 to m do # Range of representable numbers 
1 := 0;
for k to weight[j, 0] do
1 := 1*2 + comp[ weight[j,k] ];
od;
n.j[l] ;= n.j[l] +1; # count the cases
od; 
od;
for i to q do
nh0[i] := per - nhl[i]; # store the number of zero's
od;
# Now, all cases are counted.
# We start from the case that p=q, if the set p is not
# statistically independent, then decrease p by one,
# till an appropriate p is find.
p  : =  q;
while( p>l ) do
u := (per/(2^p)); # mean of observations in particular case, 
std ;= evalf(sqrt(u*(l-l/2^p))); # Standard deveiation.
# Lower Sc upper bounds for acceptable statistical value, 
lower := u - 2 * std;
upper ;= u + 2 * std; 
for j from 3 to m do
if weight[j,0] = p
then total := 0;
for k from 0 to (2Ap -1) do
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if (n. j [k] > 0) and
((n.j[k] < lower) or
(n.j[k] > upper))
then total := total + 1; fi;
Od;
if evalf(total/(2^p)) <= 0.05
then i := "; # Independency occured
i := cat(i, weight[j, 1]); 
for k from 2 to weight[j, 0] do 
i := cat(i, ','); 
i := cat(i7 weight[j7 k]);
od;
print('The statistically independent components are',i);
RE T U R N ( ) ;
fi;
fi;
od;
p := p-1; 
od;
print('No statistically independent subset is found');
end;
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Apply := proc(fx, init, long, start, fine) 
local i, j, k, 1, df; # Temporary variables, 
chi := array(1..50);
# The selected value of chi-square distribution
# associated with p = 95%
chi Cl] : = 3.841; chi [2] ::= 5.991; chi[3] := 7.815;
chi [4] : = 9.488; chi [5] ::= 11.07; chi[6] := 12.59;
chi [7] : = 14.07; chi [8] ::= 15.51; chi[9] := 16.92;
chi [10] := 18.31; chi [11] := 19.68; chi[12] ;= 21.03
chi [13] := 22.33; chi [14] := 23.69;
set._time := t ime(); # set the time.
# Generating a binary sequence (using LFSR) with characteristic
# polynomial (fx), initial value of (init) and length of (long).
# If long is greater than the period then long = period.
LFSR(fx, init, long);
lprint (' The characteristic polynomial is '); 
prettyprint := 1; 
print(fx);
lprint(' The initial valu is '
lprint(' The period of created sequence is' 
lprint(' The number of components is '
lprint(' ');
lprint(' (Exp.) for the exponentiation value '); 
lprint (' (Com.) for the number of component '); 
lprint (' (Fre.) for the Frequency test '); 
lprint (' (Ser.) for the Serial test '); 
lprint(' (Pok.) for the Poker test ');
init); 
period); 
degree(fx)
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lprint(' (Run.) for the Runs test ');
lprint(' (Aut.) for the Autocorrelation test ');
lprinti' (L.C.) for the linear complexity ');
lprint(' (ziv.) for the Ziv_Lempel complexity');
lprinti' (Res.) for the result of statistical and complexity \
measur tests ');
lprint (' (P) for pass ');
lprint(' (F) for fail ');
lprinti' (-) means test has not done ');
lprinti' (!) means the component has passed all the tests '); 
lprinti' (?) means the component has failed to pass all the \ 
tests '); 
lprint(' ');
lprint ('Exp. Com. Fre. Ser. Pok. Run. Aut. L.C. Ziv.\ 
Res.');
lprint(' \
# Applying the tests for exponents between s t a r t  and f i n e ,
# introduced to the procedure, 
for i from start to fine do
# Produce the basic exponents.
Basic_Exponents(fx);
# Raise the states of LFSR to power i 
Exponentiation(fx,sequence,i,period) ; 
dm := degree(fx);
# Applying the tests over the component sequences 
for j to dm do
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investigation := 0;
out_line := i; # Design output format,
for k from length(out_line) to 6 do 
out_line := cat(out_line, ' '); 
od;
out_line := cat(out_line, j); 
for k from length(out_line) to 12 do 
out_line := cat(out_line, ' '); 
od; .
# Applying the frequency test.
Frequency_Test(component.j,period); 
if Frequency < 0
then out_line := cat(out_line, ');
elif Frequency <= chi[DOF]
then out_line := cat(out_line, 'P ');
else out_line := cat(out_line, 'F ');
investigation := 1; 
fi;
# Applying the serial test.
Serial_Test(component.j , period); 
if Serial < 0
then out_line := cat(out_line, ');
elif Serial <= chi[DOF]
then out_line := cat(out_line, 'P ');
investigation := 1;
else out_line := cat(out_line, 'F ');
fi;
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# Applying the poker test.
Poker_Test(component.j , period); 
if Poker < 0
then out_line := cat(out_line, ');
elif Poker <= chi[DOF]
then out_line := cat(out_line, 'P ');
else out_line := cat(out_line, 'F ');
investigation := 1;
fi;
# Applying the run test.
Run_Test(component.j, period); 
if Run < 0
then out_line := cat(out_line, ');
elif Run <= chi[DOF]
then out_line := cat (out.line, 'P ');
else out_line := cat (outline, 'F ');
investigation := 1 
fi;
# Applying the autocorrelation test. 
Autocorrelation_Test(component. j , period); 
if Autocorrelation <0
then out_line := cat (outline, ');
elif Autocorrelation >= 95 
then out_line := cat(out_line, 'P ');
investigation := 1;
else out_line := cat(out_line, 'F ');
fi;
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# Applying the linear complexity test.
Berlekamp_Massey(component.j,period,j);
if Linear_Complexity > (period / 2)
then out_line := cat(out_line, 'p ('); 
else out_line := cat(out_line, 'F ('); 
investigation := 1; 
fi;
out_line := cat(out_line, Linear_Complexity );
out_line := cat(out_line, ')' );
# Designing of output's format.
for 1 from length(out_line) to 49 do 
out_line := cat(out_line, ' ');
od;
# Applying Ziv-Lempel complexity test.
Ziv_Lempel (component.j, period);
if Ziv_Lempel_Complexity >
(period/ evalf(log[2](period+1)) ) 
then out_line := cat(out_line, 'P ('); 
else out_line := cat(out_line, 'F ('); 
investigation := 1;
fi;
out_line := cat(out_line, Ziv_Lempel_Complexity);
out_line := cat(out_line, ')' );
# Designing of output's format.
od;
for 1 from length(out_line) to 56 do
out_line := cat(out_line, ' ');
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if investigation = 0
then out_line := cat(out_line, ' ! ');
else out_line := cat(out_line, ' ? '); fi;
lprint(out_line); 
od;
# Applying cross correlation test.
Cross_Correlation(component, dm, period); 
lprintC ');
od;
ttime := trunc ( timeO - set_time );
lprint (' Execution time is ttime, 'seconds' );
end;
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E x a m p l e  A . l
Apply(l+x+x'M, '1000', 20, 1, 15);
The characteristic polynomial is l + x + x*
The initial valu is 1000
The period of created sequence is 15 
The number of components is 4
(Exp.) for the exponentiation value 
(Com. ) for the number of component 
(Fre.) for the Frequency test 
(Ser.) for the Serial test 
(Pok.) for the Poker test 
(Run.) for the Runs test 
(Aut.) for the Autocorrelation test 
(L.C.) for the linear complexity 
(Ziv. ) for the Ziv_Lempel complexity
(Res.) for the result of statistical and complexity measur tests 
(P) for pass 
(F) for fail
(-) means test has not done
( ! ) means the component has passed all the tests
(?) means the component has failed to ;pass all the tests
Exp. Com. Fre. Ser. Pok. Run. Aut . L.C. Ziv. Res.
1 1 P - - - P F (4) P (6) 7
1 2 P - - - P F (4) P (5) 7
1 3 P - - - P F (4) P (5) 7
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4 P - -  - P F (4) P (7) ?
The statistically independent components are, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
1 P - -  - P F (4) P (6) ?
2 P - - - P F (4) P (5) ?
3 P - - - P F (4) P (6) ?
4 P - - - P F (4) P (7) ?
The statistically independent components are, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
1 P - - . - P P (10) P (5) !
2 P - - - P P (10) P (6) !
3 P - - - F F (4) P (4) ?
4 F - - - P P (10) P (5) ?
The statistically independent components are, 2 , 3 , 4
1 P - - - P F (4) P (5) ?
2 P - - - P F (4) P (6) ?
3 P - - - P F (4) P (6) ?
4 P - - - P F (4) P (7) ?
The statistically independent components are, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
1 P - -  -  P P (8) P (4) i
2 P - -  -  P P (8) P (5) j
3 P - -  -  P P (8) P (5) i
4 F - -  -  F F (0) F (2) ?
The statistically independent components are, 1,3
1 P - -  -  P P (10) P (6) i
2 P - -  -  F F (4) P (4) 9
3 P - -  -  P P (10) P (5) 1
136
6
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
9
10
10
10
10
11
11
APPENDIX
4 F - - - P P (10) P (5)  ?
The statistically independent components are, 2,3,4
1. P - - - p P (10) P (7) !
2 P - - - P P (14) P (5)  !
3 P - - - F P (14) P (7) ?
4 P - - - P P (14) P (6) !
The statistically independent components are, 1,2,3,4
1 P - - - P F (4) P (6) ?
2 P - - - P F (4) P (6) ?
3 P - - - P F (4) P (5)  ?
4 P - - - P F (4) P (7) ?
The statistically independent components are, 1,2,3,4
1 P - - - P F (6) P (5)  ?
2 P - - - P F (6) P (5)  ?
3 P - - - P P (10) P (6) !
4 F - - - P P (10) P (5)  ?
The statistically independent components are, 2,3,4
1 P - - - P P (8) P (4)  !
2 P - - - P P (8) P (5)  !
3 P - - - P P (8) P (5)  !
4 F - - - F F (0) F (2)  ?
The statistically independent components are, 1,3
1 P - - - F P (14) F (3)  ?
2 P - _ — P P (8) P (6)  i
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11 3 P - -  - P P (14) P (5) !
11 4 P - -  - P P (14) P (6) !
The s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t componen t s  a r e , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
12 1 P - -  - P F (6) P (6) ?
12 2 P - -  - P P (10) P (5) !
12 3 P - -  - P F (6) P (5) ?
12 4 F - -  _ P P (10) P (5) ?
The statistically independent components are, 2,3,4
13 1 P - -  - P P (14) P (7) !
13 2 P - -  -  F P (12) P (7) !
13 3 P - -  -  P P (8) P (6) !
13 4 P - -  -  P P (14) P (6) !
The s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t  component s  a r e , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
14 1 P - -  -  P P (14) P (5) !
14 2 P - -  -  F P (14) P (7) ?
14 3 P - -  -  F P (12) P (7) !
14 4 P - - - -  P P (14) P (6) !
The s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t  component s  a r e , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
15 1 F - -  - F F (1) F (2) ?
15 2 F - -  - F F (0) F (2) ?
15 3 F - -  -  F F (0) F (2) ?
15 4 F - -  -  F F (0) F (2) ?
No statistically independent subset is found
Execution time is 78 seconds
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